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Abstract
This dissertation is composed of three chapters. In the first chapter, I investigate
how firms’ capital structure decisions respond to changes in collateral value,
caused by real estate price shock. Through the collateral channel, shocks to
the value of real estate can have a significant impact on the firms’ borrowing
capacity. In this chapter, I provide evidence on this mechanism by using Loan-
to-Value (henceforth LTV) ratio caps on mortgages in a number of European
countries as policy shocks that affect real estate prices. I conduct a difference-in-
difference exercise using a unique and comprehensive micro panel data covering
both Large and Small & Medium Enterprises (henceforth SMEs). This allows
me to better identify and quantify the effects of policy shocks to the value of firm
collateral by distinguishing them from local demand shocks and local general
equilibrium effects. I find a significant collateral damage on firms’ balance
sheets, a consequence of LTV policy shock, which in turn caused i) secured
debt to decrease in firms with high collateral value more than in firms with low
collateral value, and ii) trade credit use to increase in firms with high collateral
value more than in firms with low collateral value. These findings document a
new evidence on how firms adjust to shocks to the value of collateral through
trade credit use. These findings also highlight that macroprudential policies
in one sector–such as LTV ratio caps targeting household sector–might result
in an unintended consequence in another sector–such as collateral damage in
corporate sector. This is an important caveat that policy makers should consider
when implementing macroprudential policy.
In the second chapter, my coauthors and I construct a model of incentives
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suggesting that interlocking balance sheets through accounts receivable and ac-
counts payable provide incentives necessary to sustain long production chains.
One of the implications of this model is that upstream firms in the produc-
tion chain have higher accounts receivable. Further, the working capital of
upstream firms are relatively more sensitive to the availability of credit. Using
a large firm-level data set for 15 European OECD countries and the United
States, 2000–2009, combined with sector-level measures of relative position in
production chains (“upstreamness”), we find strong empirical support for the
model. Lack of credit matters for amplifying recessions in economies with long
production chains.
In the third chapter, my coauthors and I present new stylized facts on bank
and firm leverage during the period 2000–2009 using internationally comparable
micro level data from many countries. We document the following patterns: a)
there was an increase in leverage for investment banks prior to the sub-prime
crisis; b) there was no visible increase in leverage for the typical commercial
bank and non-financial firm; c) off-balance-sheet items constitute a big fraction
of assets, especially for large commercial banks in the US, whereas investment
banks do not report these items; d) the leverage ratio is procyclical for invest-
ment banks and for large commercial banks in the US; e) banks in emerging
markets with tighter bank regulation and stronger investor protection experi-
enced significantly less deleveraging during the crisis. The results suggest that
excessive risk taking before the crisis was not easily detectable because the risk
involved the quality rather than the quantity of assets.
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Yağmur Seda Yeşiltaş. She first became my best friend and then became a loyal
follower of my dreams including even immature ones. While I was pursuing my
dream of having a Ph.D. degree, she was again there whenever I needed her.
I am thankful not only for this, but most importantly for being my greatest
source of pride and for being the sunshine and joy of my life.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my second mom, Yurdanur Uslu; my
second dad, Erbil Uslu; my second sisters, Eylem Uslu, Evrim Uslu-Ayaydın,
and Demet Uslu-Aydın for making me feel I was home during the years in
Istanbul when I started to think of pursuing graduate study in economics.
I would also thank my dearest grandmother Nazime Keskin, my wonderful
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Chapter 1
The Collateral Channel: Firm
Leverage and Real Estate Prices
1.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates how firms’ capital structure decisions respond to changes
in collateral value, caused by real estate price shock. The contributions of this
chapter are twofold. First, using a unique and comprehensive firm-level data,
I identify and quantify the impact of a change in the value of real estate as-
sets on firms’ debt financing decisions. Second, I provide new evidence on how
firms’ borrowing capacity, strongly associated with collateral pledging, deter-
mines firms’ choice between secured and unsecured debt financing. Therefore,
this chapter assesses the role of collateral channel in transmitting boom-bust
cycles in real estate markets to the corporate sector.
Real estate booms have been often associated with economic and financial
busts. As a consequence, academics and policy makers have been trying to un-
derstand how these booms are transmitted to the real economy. The relevant
theoretical literature suggests that the “collateral channel” might have an im-
portant role in transmitting shocks in real estate markets to the real economy:
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the bursting of a real estate market bubble adversely affects the value of col-
laterizable real estate assets. Declining collateral values lead to higher cost of
external financing which forces firms to decrease borrowing and lower invest-
ment leading to a decline in output (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). Although
there is a significant body of theoretical literature that suggests the significance
of the collateral channel, there has been a limited number of empirical studies
that identifies and quantifies its economic impact. This chapter is one of the
papers that attempts to fill this gap in the literature.
In recent years, a number of European countries have experienced a huge
increase in real estate prices associated with rapid credit growth and lax lending
standards. Policy makers recommended that banks should apply maximum
loan-to-value ratios on mortgages (henceforth referred to as “LTV ratio caps”)
with the aim of damping credit growth and price inflation in housing markets.1
Indeed, tightening of LTV ratio of mortgages led to a slowdown in price inflation
in housing markets. Their policy experiment provides an ideal setting: it solves
the endogeneity problem typically encountered in this type of study. It is a
policy shock that is plausibly exogenous to any individual firm. This policy
shock then has a general equilibrium effect on the value of real estate assets
through the demand and supply of houses, and it is affecting firm financing
decisions through collateral channel.
My hypothesis is that if LTV ratio cap is effective in curbing borrowers’
demand by tightening borrowers’ capacity to borrow, this will have a negative
1See Section 1.2 for further details on policy experiments of LTV ratio cap in European
countries.
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effect on real estate prices, then firms who had higher valued collateral pre-
LTV policy shock should experience a bigger drop after-LTV policy shock in
their secured borrowing relative to firms who had lower valued collateral pre-
LTV policy shock. In order to test this hypothesis, I develop a difference-
in-difference estimation with firm fixed effects. The estimation, by interacting
firm collateral with a time dummy that separates the period before and after the
LTV policy shock, captures before-after shock difference in secured borrowing of
firms with similar collateral on their balance sheet prior the LTV policy shock.
The inclusion of firm fixed effects is important because the LTV policy shock
might affect different firms differently due to unobserved firm characteristics.
For example, if high risk taker firms hold less collateral on average, such firms
might be affected differentially from the LTV policy shock. In the estimation,
this average affect will be fully absorbed by firm fixed effects, and will not
invalidate the identification. The identification will come from the timing of the
policy shock interacted with predetermined value of firm collateral, which is not
allowed to move with the policy shock.
Using a large sample containing non-financial non-real estate firms, I study
the episodes of LTV ratio caps on mortgages in Europe (Bulgaria: 2004–2007,
Hungary: 2010–present, The Netherlands: 2008–present, Norway: 2010–present,
Sweden: 2010–present, and Turkey: 2010–present). In benchmark difference-
in-difference estimation, I regress firm leverage (total debt to total assets) on
its determinants where collateral is interacted with LTV dummy. Since this is a
dummy that takes value 1 in the year(s) when the LTV ratio cap is in place, it
allows me to understand how the impact of collateral on firm leverage is affected
by this policy shock through its effect on real estate prices. I find a significant
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collateral damage effect on firm leverage after the LTV ratio cap. This effect
is different for firms with differential collateral values: the LTV ratio cap de-
creased leverage in firms with high collateral value by 0.9 percentage points
more than in firms with low collateral value. The result is robust to different
specifications.
This chapter is related to the recent empirical studies by Gan (2007), Chaney,
Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) and Cvijanović (2014) who use local variations in
real estate price movements as shocks to the value of collateral to identify the
causal impact of financial shocks on firms’ decisions. Gan (2007) investigates
Japan’s land market collapse in early 1990’s. Within a difference-in-difference
like approach, she estimates pre-shock landholdings in 1989 as an exogenous
instrument to identify the effect of the bursting of real estate bubble on the
average investment rate during five years after the shock, 1994 to 1998. She
shows that land-holding Japanese firms were more affected by the shock than
firms with no land. Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) and Cvijanović (2014)
focus on US real estate price boom between 1993–2006 that resulted in a large
dispersion in real estate price movements between US states and cities. They
follow an instrumental variables approach to isolate the variation in local real
estate prices, which may be endogenous to firms’ decisions. They both showed
that firms significantly change their decisions in response to collateral value
appreciation.
My relative contribution is twofold. First, the difference-in-difference ap-
proach and the richness of data set I use allow me to better identify the ef-
fects of shocks to collateral values by distinguishing them from local demand
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shocks and local general equilibrium effects. One concern with the existing es-
timates is that the correlation between changes in collateral values and changes
in firms’ decisions might be observed due to a reverse causality problem: say, in
response to increases in investment (accompanied by increases in borrowing),
large publicly traded firms may have a significant impact on local real estate
prices through increases in local business activity and demand for labor. In-
deed, in the existing papers, focusing only on large publicly traded firms might
be biasing the estimates. However, by using a comprehensive sample dominated
by small firms, I minimize the possibility of such reverse causality problem in
the estimation.
There is another concern with existing estimates that unobserved variation
within a particular location and year might drive the results. To be precise,
consider the possibility that real estate price shocks are actually affecting the
balance sheet of consumers, not of firms, and this might drive the results through
the changes in local demand. I solve this by using four-digit sector-year fixed
effects to control for demand. These effects will absorb the impact of changes in
local demand for the four-digit sector that the firms operate in. I assume that
most of the changes in local demand derive from narrowly defined sector-specific
factors. The identifying assumption requires that firms with high collateral value
are subject to similar local demand shocks as firms with low collateral value in
the same four-digit sector and any remaining variation in firm specific demand
conditions does not vary systematically by the collateral value. I am not the
first to control for demand using sector fixed effects (e.g., Nanda and Nicholas
(2014) and Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and Hirsch (2014)) but to the best of my
knowledge, Kalemli-Ozcan, Laeven, and Moreno (2015) and this chapter are the
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first to allow these effects to vary at a very fine level of sector classification.
Second, existing papers use only large publicly traded firms as in most of
the papers studying investment and capital structure decisions in the literature.
Being less financially constrained, such firms are least likely to pledge collateral
when they borrow from financial institutions. This might lead to a downward
bias of the effect of real estate price shock. However, I develop a unique and
comprehensive data set that covers not only large publicly traded firms, but
also small and medium private firms. The inclusion of small and medium firms
is crucial given the structure of European economies. Europe consists of bank-
dominant economies tilted toward externally dependent SMEs, and among all
sources of external financing, European firms typically prefer debt to finance
working capital and/or fixed capital (e.g., Kalemli-Ozcan, Laeven, and Moreno
(2015)).23 Tangible assets have been very often pledged as collateral in business
lending, and European banks heavily prefer real-estate as collateral especially
for SMEs.45 Therefore, with the inclusion of SMEs, I can obtain more accurate
estimates of collateral in the analysis of firms’ debt financing decisions, then
2According to the recent report of European Commission, across the EU-28 in 2013, some
21.6 million SMEs (firms with less than 250 employees) in the non-financial corporate sector
employed 88.8 million people and generated 3,666 trillion euro in terms of value added. In
other words, 99 out of every 100 businesses are SMEs, as are 2 in every 3 employees and 58
cents in every euro of value added.
3Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, Villegas-Sanchez, Volosovych, and Yesiltas (2015) shows how
well the data used in this chapter covers the universe of European firms compared to official
statistics from Eurostat along several dimensions. See this paper for further statistics.
4One of the recent reports developed by International Finance Corporation states that
while land and buildings are widely accepted as collateral for loans, the use of movable col-
lateral (such as inventory, accounts receivable, crops, machinery and equipment) is restricted
due to the lack of functioning laws and registries to govern secured transactions. For further
details, see Secured Transactions Systems & Collateral Registries Toolkit (2010).
5For instance, according to the World Bank Investment Climate Survey of 6,511 firms in
24 European countries, nearly 63% of the loans required collateral, and 77% of these loans
are secured by real estate (land, buildings, houses owned by the entrepreneurs). For further
details, see http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
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precisely link them to the actual changes in aggregate corporate debt move-
ments.
Turning to the results, I find a significant collateral damage effect on firm
leverage both at the micro level and at the aggregate level. The micro es-
timates I obtain from difference-in-difference estimation provide important in-
sights: tightening of LTV ratios result in a significant collateral damage in firms’
balance sheets by lowering real estate prices. This in turn causes a bigger drop
in secured lending of SMEs relative to large firms with similar collateral on
their balance sheet prior the LTV policy shock. According to the back-of-the-
envelope calculation I develop, these micro estimates also show that collateral
damage can explain around 16 % of the actual decline in aggregate corporate
sector.
The collateral channel also has important implications for the usage of trade
credit.6 According to the “balance-sheet channel,” changes in monetary policy
have potential impact on firms’ ability to borrow by changing the value of
collateral (Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). The empirical literature has found
that trade credit usage changes as a response to monetary policy shocks and
business downturns (e.g., Choi and Kim (2005), Mateut, Bougheas, and Mizen
(2006), and Nilsen (2002)). To the best of my knowledge, this chapter is the
first to provide evidence on how the usage of trade credit responds to changes
in collateral value, caused by real estate price shock. In this chapter, I ask this
6There is an extensive literature of both theoretical and empirical papers explaining the
existence of trade credit. Some emphasize the transaction motive for trade credit, while others
emphasize the financial motivation. There are also many papers that have analyzed whether
trade credit and bank loan are substitutes or complements. See Giannetti, Burkart, and
Ellingsen (2011), Love (2011), and Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2013) for the comprehensive
reviews of this literature.
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specific question: Did firms that experience a collateral damage after the LTV
policy shock turn to trade credit as an alternative source of finance?
The sample used in this chapter represents an ideal setting to answer this
question. First, as will be shown later, with the exception of Hungary, trade
credit accounts for at least roughly one-fourth of the total debt of a represen-
tative firm, and about one-third of the short-term debt. Second, besides trade
credit, alternative sources of finance are mostly unavailable to firms of the Euro-
pean countries that I focus on: the development of the stock and bond markets
is modest.7 Then, to the extent that credit to firms is more likely to be rationed
by financial institutions, the impact of collateral damage (as a consequence of
the LTV policy shock) will be magnified, and the net impact will be determined
by the extent to which trade credit use offsets financial credit. According to the
results, collateral damage caused debt use on secured basis to decrease in firms
with high collateral value by 1.2 percentage points more than in firms with low
collateral value, whereas it caused trade credit use to increase in firms with high
collateral value by 0.2 percentage points more than in firms with low collateral
value. Thus, this result provides a new evidence on how the corporate sector
adjusts to collateral shocks through unsecured lending: firms that experienced
a collateral damage after the LTV policy shock turned to trade credit, allowing
the corporate sector to mitigate the effects of such shocks.
There is an extensive literature that analyzes the role of collateral pledging
in determining firms’ borrowing capacity. However, due to data limitations,
almost all papers in this literature preclude the analyses of SMEs. One of the
7As shown later, in Europe, two meaningful sources of external finance are financial loans
and trade credit, whereas the proportion of bonds in firm finance is limited.
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contributions of this paper then is to incorporate firm heterogeneity in this
analysis. Using a sample that consists of both large firms and SMEs, I estimate
the effect of asset tangibility as proxy for collateral on borrowing capacity of
firms of different sizes. According to the estimation results, the impact of asset
tangibility on debt capacity is pronounced across all firms of different sizes,
but less pronounced across very small firms (i.e., micro enterprises8). This
finding suggests that the interpretation of the role of asset tangibility in the
determination of firms’ borrowing capacity should be done with caution: asset
tangibility does not inversely measure the extent of financing constraints, but
rather measures firms’ ability to pledge collateral. Firms’ ability to pledge
collateral increases firms’ borrowing capacity to the extent that tangible assets
on firms’ balance sheet are liquid (e.g., Campello and Giambona (2013)).
There is also a growing literature that studies the effectiveness of macro-
prudential policies.9 In this literature, there are several papers that provide
evidence on whether LTV and DTI10 ratio caps are effective in mitigating the
negative effects of housing boom by controlling credit growth and asset price
inflation (e.g., Crowe, DellAriccia, Igan, and Rabanal (2013), Kuttner and Shim
(2013)). While suggestive, these studies come with many caveats. Due to data
limitations and/or identification struggles, they are not able to clarify the chan-
nels through which an LTV cap reduces systemic risk. This paper highlights one
micro-level mechanism through which LTV caps on mortgages limit the positive
feedback between asset price inflation and firms’ capacity to borrow. Doing so,
8Micro enterprises are firms with employees less than 10.
9See Claessens (2015), Claessens, Ghosh, and Mihet (2013), and Lim (2011) for a compre-
hensive review of existing studies.
10Debt-to-Income.
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this paper provides a new evidence on how macroprudential policies targeting
one sector–such as LTV ratio caps in household sector–might result in an un-
intended consequence in another sector–such as collateral damage in corporate
sector. This is an important caveat that policy makers should consider when
implementing macroprudential policy.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the policy experiments
with LTV ratios. Section 1.3 presents the details about data. Section 1.4
explains the methodology. Section 1.5 presents empirical analysis. Section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 Policy Experiments with LTV Ratio Cap
In principle, macroprudential policies aim to limit the risk of widespread disrup-
tions to the provision of financial services and thereby minimize the impact of
such disruptions on real economy as a whole (Lim (2011)). Among others, LTV,
LTI11 and DSTI12 caps have increasingly been implemented to reduce systemic
risk generated by strong credit growth and credit-driven asset price inflation
during boom-bust episodes. The caps are viewed as having macro-prudential
impact through restricting the quantity of credit by limiting the funding avail-
able for certain borrowers to dampen growth in asset prices. In addition, they
enhance the resilience of both the banks and their borrowers.13
The caps on LTV ratios are particularly popular in Asian and European
countries. According to a survey conducted by the IMF in 2010, 20 out of 49
11Loan-to-Income.
12Debt-Service-to-Income.
13Figure 1.1 depicts the transmission channel of a tightening of the LTV, LTI, and DSTI
limits.
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countries use caps on LTV ratios as a macro-prudential instrument. Specifically,
among 20 countries, 11 countries set fixed caps while 9 countries adopt time-
varying caps (Lim (2011)).
LTV ratio cap is a cap on the ratio of the value of the loan (L) relative
to the value of the underlying collateral (V). LTV ratio cap imposes a limit
on borrowers’ capacity to borrow on collateralized lending. LTV ratios are not
harmonised under the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and/or Capital
Requirements Regulation (CRR), and rather are implemented at national dis-
cretion. LTV ratio cap can be viewed as a recommendation or restriction of
credit standards that banks should follow when issuing loans. Therefore, the
explicit LTV limits vary both across types of loan within a country as well as
across countries. The LTV limit in an individual country is usually related to
the type of loan (commercial versus residential) and currency of the loan (do-
mestic versus foreign currency) with foreign currency mortgages usually being
subject to stricter LTV limits. Furthermore, the coverage of institutions to
which the explicit LTV limit is applied varies across countries.
I undertake a detailed investigation for this particular policy action. The pol-
icy action data set used in this paper draws on a variety of sources. I use data
sources from several studies developed by Borio and Shim (2007), Claessens,
Ghosh, and Mihet (2013), Claessens (2015), Crowe, DellAriccia, Igan, and Ra-
banal (2013), Hilbers, Otker-Robe, Pazarbasioglu, and Johnsen (2005), Kuttner
and Shim (2013), Lim (2011), Lim, Krznar, Lipinsky, Otani, and Wu (2013), and
Srobona, Jaromı́r Benes, Lund-Jensen, Schmieder, and Severo (2011). Wherever
available, I also use the official documents from central banks and supervisory
& regulatory authorities including their annual reports and financial stability
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reports, press releases, email responses from these institutions. I use these
secondary sources to cross-check them with the information available in the
above-mentioned studies. Doing so, I obtain full and accurate information on
relevant policy actions. The final data set allows me to precisely identify the
details of implementation date of the LTV ratio policy in a set of European
countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Turkey.
The details about the implementation of these policy experiments are indicated
in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: LTV Ratio Policy Experiments
Country Authority Dates Active
Bulgaria Bulgarian National Bank June 2004–December 2007
Hungary Magyar Nemzeti Bank March 2010–present
Netherlands Rijksoverheid (Dutch government) 2007–present
Norway Norges Bank March 2010–present
Sweden Finansinspektionen & Sveriges Riksbank 2010–present
Turkey Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency December 2010–present
Notes: Table 1.1 reports both the time period and the national authority that associated
with the LTV ratio policy.
In the below, I briefly document the background that motivates LTV ratio
policy action as well as the details regarding its implementation in the corre-
sponding country.
• Bulgaria: Credit to households grew rapidly during transition to EU
accession. A credit boom was accompanied by a house price boom in
early 2000s. Towards mid 2000s, while the credit risk in corporate sector
stabilized, it continued to accelerate in household and mortgage sector.
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Thus, Bulgarian National Bank introduced LTV ratio caps on mortgages.
To be exact, in June 2004, LTV ratio on mortgages risk-weighted at 50%
is lowered to a 70%; and in April 2006 the risk weighting for mortgage
loans used in the calculation of the capital adequacy ratio is effectively
raised by lowering LTV ratio from 70 % to 50 %.
• Hungary: In 2010, a large share of mortgage loans was provided in for-
eign currency which made unhedged borrowers in the household sector
vulnerable to exchange rate volatility. To address the excessive foreign
currency lending in household sector, the authorities took some LTV ra-
tio policy actions. To illustrate, in March 2010, the maximum LTV ratio
was set at 75, 60 and 45 % for forint, euro and other foreign currency
loans, respectively. The relevant LTV limits are somewhat higher for ve-
hicle financing loans and residential real estate leasing (80, 65 and 50 %
respectively for forint, euro and other foreign currency loans). This limit
applies to all institutions providing financial services in Hungary.
• The Netherlands: The recent Dutch housing market slump follows a
long period of very rapid growth in property prices. Between 1985 and
2007, house prices rose by a cumulative 228%, while consumer prices in-
creased only 56%. Dutch demand for houses was also boosted by govern-
ment policy. Traditionally, the Dutch government has pursued a policy
of promoting home ownership. This limited access to social housing and
continued rise in house prices encouraged households including low-income
earners. Banks were quite willing to lend to this group, even at very high
LTV ratios (the average LTV ratio was 114 % in 2007). Additionally,
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mortgage interest rates were very attractive. They declined from 7.12 %
in 1995 to 4.82% in 2007. Market sentiment changed over the course of
2007, triggered by the sub-prime mortgage problems in the United States.
Dutch banks also started to question lending standards. Before 2007,
banks had substantial leeway in their lending to households. However,
in 2007, the banks signed up to “Mortgage Lenders’ Code of Conduct.”
In 2011, for all financial intermediaries under this supervision, the code
was tightened introducing an LTV ratio of 104% (plus transfer tax) on
mortgages. In combination, LTV limit for new mortgage loans decreases
stepwise 1 percentage point per annum from 106% in 2012 to 100% in
2018.
• Norway: Household debt (mainly mortgages) reached a high level and
was a key risk in Norway. Low unemployment and wealth effects from
increases in oil prices helped to boost the accumulation of household
debt. Lax lending standards and aggressive mortgage lending practices
also played a key role. To address the problem of housing debt, in March
2010, Norges Bank set LTV limit at 90%. According to law, LTV ratios
on home equity loans should generally not exceed 75 %. Further, in De-
cember 2011, the authority tightened the law by lowering LTV ratio on
mortgages to 85%, and lowering LTV ratio on home equity loans to 70 %.
• Sweden: The Swedish mortgage market is large. Since the mid-1990s,
housing prices have risen and mortgage debts of households have increased
substantially. In 2001, mortgages comprised 30 % of the Swedish banks
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total lending secured on housing. Although housing prices and indebt-
edness of households in Sweden temporarily dampened after the recent
Global Financial Crisis, they have subsequently continued to rise. To ad-
dress the risks of excessive household leverage and rising housing prices,
Sveriges Riksbank introduced an LTV ratio cap on mortgages in 2010.
According to general guideline of Financial Stability Authority (Finansin-
spektionen), LTV ratio has been decreased to 85 % of a property’s value.
It applies to all credit institutions providing mortgages, but only covers
new loans.
• Turkey: After the recent Global Financial Crisis, Turkey observed a rapid
increase in domestic demand and credit growth, and increased foreign cur-
rency borrowing by banks. In late 2010, Banking Regulation and Super-
vision Agency applied limits on mortgages in order to curb credit growth
and increase credit quality: LTV ratio decreased to 75 % on housing loans,
LTV ratio decreased to 50% on commercial real estate loans.
Figures 1.2–1.3 show that tightening of LTV ratio on mortgages led to a
slowdown in price inflation in housing markets of all countries I focus on. This
policy shock also led to a slowdown in prices in commercial markets as shown
in Figure 1.6. I observe such a correlation between the price movements of resi-
dential property and commercial property due to the fact that both commercial
and residential property use and compete for the same fixed supply of land (Di-
Pasquale and Wheaton (1996)). Therefore, as mentioned above, these policy
experiments of LTV ratio cap on mortgages present an ideal setting in order to
investigate how firms’ debt financing decisions respond to price changes in real
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estate markets. I will discuss this in detail in Section 1.4.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Firm-level Data
In my analysis, I use cross-country firm-level data from ORBIS. ORBIS is a
commercial data set compiled by Bureau Van Dijk (BvD) that provides ad-
ministrative data on millions of firms in Europe. The financial statements are
initially collected by local Chambers of Commerce and in turn, is relayed to
BvD through some 40 different information providers.
The data set has financial accounting information from detailed, harmonized
balance-sheets, income statements and profit/loss accounts of both financial
and non-financial firms. This data set is crucially different from other data sets
that are commonly-used in the literature such as COMPUSTAT for the United
States, COMPUSTAT Global, and Worldscope databases, since 99 percent of
the companies in ORBIS are private, whereas former data sets contain mainly
information on large listed companies. In ORBIS, only less than 2 percent of the
firms are publicly listed (which is also separately marketed under the product
called OSIRIS).
As stated in Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, Villegas-Sanchez, Volosovych, and
Yesiltas (2015), there are several inherent biases affecting the download process,
and a number of irregularities in the raw data, which will result in large data
loss unless they are dealt with. Then, I fully follow their detailed instructions
in order to construct a database that is nationally representative with minimal
missing information.
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In order to show how representative the data I use in this paper is, I refer
to Table 1.2.14 This table shows how much of the official gross output data
from Eurostat is covered by the firms in ORBIS–AMADEUS data for the to-
tal economy for a sample of European countries. These countries refer to the
countries with policy experiments of LTV ratio cap on mortgages: Bulgaria,
Hungary, The Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey. Each cell is the ratio of value
of total output produced by the firms in ORBIS–AMADEUS data relative to
value of total output produced as in the official data. For a given country-
year, ratios are computed by taking the ratio of aggregated gross output values
where aggregated gross output is computed by totalling gross output over com-
mon available sectors for which the gross-output related variable is available in
both data sets.15 Missing ratios still appear in some country-year due to miss-
ing Eurostat data. As shown in Table 1.2 with the exception of Netherlands,
ORBIS–AMADEUS data can account more than 50 percent of the aggregate
output in all countries.
The sample I use in this paper is mainly composed of micro (1–9 employees),
small (10–49 employees) and medium (50–249 employees) enterprises that ac-
count for a significant fraction of economic activity in Europe and the majority
of economic activity in the sample of selected European countries mentioned
above. In Table 1.3, each cell corresponds to the share of indicated size cate-
gory’s number of firms in total economy from the relevant data source for the
given country in 2010. Number of firms is summed over overlapping sectors
14This table is reproduced from Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 of Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen,
Villegas-Sanchez, Volosovych, and Yesiltas (2015).
15See Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, Villegas-Sanchez, Volosovych, and Yesiltas (2015) for fur-
ther details on the construction of percentages.
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with Eurostat SBS data. This table illustrates that the sample is broadly rep-
resentative in terms of size distribution. This feature is an important difference
of this paper relative to the literature that works with both financial and real
variables at the firm level. Most of this literature focuses on listed firms that
account for less than 1 percent of the observations in the sample.
The main financial variables used in the analysis are total assets, sales,
tangible fixed assets, components of debt, cash holdings, inventory, and earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). I transform
financial variables to real using CPI with 2005 base and converting to dollars
using the end-of-year 2005 dollar/national currency exchange rate. The data
set has detailed sector classification (up to four-digit NACE Rev. 2 industry
classification). I drop financial firms, real-estate and government-owned firms,
and use all the other sectors.16 I use two different samples in analysis: Full
Sample and Permanent Sample. Full sample contains all firms that are present
in the database for at least three years before LTV ratio cap policy, and one
year when LTV ratio cap is in place. This sample includes unbalanced panels
from the following countries with the relevant periods given in parentheses:
Bulgaria (1997–2013), Hungary (1997–2012), Netherlands (1997–2012), Norway
(2004–2013), Sweden (1998–2013) and Turkey (2003–2012). Permanent sample
covers firms from the Full sample without non-consecutive yearly observations
(i.e.,which appear, disappear and reappear in the sample). This sample includes
balanced panels from the following countries with the relevant periods given in
16I also drop firms operating in the sectors outside SNA production boundary (NACE Rev.
2 sectors T & U).
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parentheses: Hungary (2004–2012), Netherlands (2000–2012), Norway (2004–
2013), Sweden (1999–2012) and Turkey (2005–2012).17 Tables 1.4–1.5 (A.1–A.2)
show the percentages of firms by firm type and country in the Full (Permanent)
sample. The firms in each country’s sample refer to ones with non-missing
value of the variable on which the percentages are based. In the table, each
cell corresponds to the share of indicated category’s number of firms in total
economy of the given country-period (%). In the first two panels, shares are
constructed based on firm size, and firm size is measured by the logarithm of real
total assets and the number of employees, respectively. In the bottom panel,
firms are categorized based on firm age.
1.3.2 Variable Definitions
The measures of debt and firm controls that I examine in capital structure
regressions are coming from the intersection of influential papers on the topic
over the last two decades. In this section, I firstly provide a detailed discussion
about the measures of debt, secondly I define the variables I use as firm controls
in the empirical analysis.
There are differences in the composition of total debt, so the type of firm
debt analyzed should base on the objective of the analysis. The objective of this
analysis is to investigate how changes in firm collateral are related to changes
in firm capital structure decisions. The components of debt have different rela-
tionship with firm collateral, for example trade credit use is higher in firms with
low levels of pledgable assets whereas secured debt use is higher in firms with
17I apply different cleaning steps and quality checks before constructing these two samples.
The details regarding all this procedure is available in Section A.1
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high levels of pledgable assets. The most appropriate way to analyze different
debt measures would be firstly to separate total debt as “secured debt” and
“unsecured debt.” I do not have matched data at firm-bank level, but I can still
make a plausible distinction between secured and unsecured debt. For example,
“Loans” and “Trade Creditors,” which are sub-accounts of current liabilities in
the balance sheet can be treated as secured debt and unsecured debt, respec-
tively. Because loans that are provided by financial institutions heavily require
collateral, whereas trade credit that is provided by suppliers does not require
collateral.
In addition, total debt includes items like income tax payable, social ex-
penditure payable, pension fund provisions, which are used for other purposes
rather than financing, so it may overstate the amount of financial debt. Such
items are recorded in balance sheet under the account called “Other Liabil-
ities.” However, this account also covers other items such as “Other Short-
term Debt,” “Other Short-term Creditors,” and “Other Long-term Non-Interest
Bearing Debt,” which are all used for financing purposes. Thus, excluding such
types of debt from total debt might underestimate the amount of financial debt.
None of these items are reported under “Other Liabilities” as in separate sub-
accounts. Given this caveat in reporting of sub-accounts, therefore, in order
to avoid any estimation errors, I use different alternative measures as follows:
TotDebt : The sum of short-term and long-term debt; FinDebtTOL: Total debt
excluding trade credit; FinDebt : Total debt excluding trade credit and other
liabilities; STFinDebt : Short-term debt from financial institution; STFinDebt-
STOL: Short-term Debt excluding trade credit, and TC : Trade Credit.18
18The details on the composition of liabilities are available in Section A.2.
20
The determinants of firm financing decisions I use in the empirical analysis
are the ones commonly used in the related literature. To proxy Collateral, I
consider all types of pledgable assets that firms are able to post as collateral in
loan/credit applications. In balance sheets, pledgable assets refer to total book
value of tangible fixed assets (“PP&E”) which are composite of net book value
of land and building, net book value of machinery and equipment, and book
value of other tangible assets such as plant and equipment in progress and leased
assets. Thus, I define asset tangibility as the ratio of total book value of tangible
fixed assets to total book value of assets and use this to measure collateral in
leverage analysis. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to book value of total
assets. This variable is used to measure internal finance. To proxy growth
opportunities, I use Sales Growth, which is defined as the logarithmic difference
of real sales (measured in 2005 constant dollars).19 Size is logarithm of book
value of total assets (measured in 2005 constant dollars). Age is the logarithm
of (1+firm age) where firm age in period t is defined as t minus the date of
incorporation plus one. To proxy firm liquidity, I use Cash, which corresponds
to the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to book value of total assets. Inventory
corresponds to total inventories (raw materials+in progress+finished goods),
19Most studies in the related literature use Tobin’s Q (measured as the ratio of market
value of total assets to book value of total assets) to proxy profitable growth opportunities.
Their analysis bases on large US firms who report their cash flow statements reported to
COMPUSTAT, so those firms have information on market values. Here, I study capital
structure of private firms of different sizes, and private firms do not have information on
market values of assets/equity. Thus, Sales Growth is the most appropriate measure for
private firms to proxy profitable growth opportunities. Similar to Sales Growth, the ratio
of intangible assets to total assets can be considered as an alternative proxy for Tobin’s Q.
Intangible assets include R&D and advertising expenses and firms are more likely to increase
such expenses when they have profitable growth opportunities. Given the limited number of
firms reporting information on intangible assets in the data, I instead use Sales Growth in my
empirical analysis.
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and is normalized by book value of total assets. Table 1.6 shows the descriptive
statistics on all these variables used in the empirical analysis. In general there is
a good deal of variation that allows me to show both economic and econometric
inferences I study in this paper.
1.4 Identification
In this paper, I aim to investigate how firms’ debt financing decisions respond to
changes in collateral value. I focus on a sample of European countries with policy
experiments of LTV ratio caps on mortgages (Bulgaria: 2004–2007, Hungary:
2010–present, The Netherlands: 2008–present, Norway: 2010–present, Sweden:
2010–present, and Turkey: 2010–present). Their policy experience provides an
ideal setting for identification. Tightening of LTV ratios on mortgages affects
house prices, a policy shock that is plausibly exogenous to any individual firm.
This policy shock has a general equilibrium effect through the demand and
supply of houses on collateral values, and it is affecting firm financing decisions
through collateral channel.
My hypothesis is that if LTV ratio cap is effective in curbing borrowers’
demand by tightening borrowers’ capacity to borrow, this will have a negative
effect on real estate prices, then firms who had higher valued collateral pre-LTV
policy shock should experience a bigger drop after-LTV policy shock in their
secured borrowing relative to firms who had lower valued collateral pre-LTV
policy shock.
In order to test this hypothesis, I develop a difference-in-difference estima-
tion including country-year, sector-year, firm fixed effects. This estimation, by
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interacting firm collateral with a time dummy that separates the period before
and after the LTV ratio policy shock, captures before-after shock difference in
secured borrowing of firms with similar collateral on their balance sheet prior
the LTV policy shock. The inclusion of fixed effects is important. These absorb
the impact on firms’ debt financing decisions of changing country and sector
conditions and factors driving both aggregate and local demand. In particular,
firm fixed effects will control for unobserved, time-invariant firm characteris-
tics. For example, if high risk taker firms hold less collateral on average, such
firms might be affected differentially from the LTV policy shock. In the esti-
mation, this average affect will be fully absorbed by firm fixed effects, and will
not invalidate the identification. Further, industry fixed effects at four-digit-
level sector codes will absorb time-varying demand conditions, because most
of demand fluctuations derive from country- and industry-specific factors, not
from firm-specific factors. Any remaining variation in firm specific demand con-
ditions does not vary systematically by the collateral value. The benchmark
difference-in-difference equation is:
yi,s,c,t = β1Collaterali,s,c × LTVc,t + β2Xi,s,c,t
+ µc,t + µs,t + µi + εi,s,c,t, (1.1)
where the indices i,s,c,t denote a firm, a sector, a country and a year, respec-
tively. I use different debt measures as dependent variables: TotDebt, FinD-
ebtTOL, and TC. X is a matrix containing standard control variables: Sales
Growth, Profitability, Size, Inventory, and Cash (see Section 1.3.2 for further
details on the construction of variables).
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Collateral is a dummy variable that equals one if asset tangibility is higher
than the median of the distribution of this variable. I prefer using this variable
as in the form of the dummy variable for two reasons. First, given the interac-
tion specification, indicator variable makes the interpretation of the coefficient
straightforward by identifying the group of interest clearly. Second, to avoid
concerns about selection into becoming high collateral holder a consequence of
the policy, Collateral is a predetermined firm-level dummy which bases on the
value of asset tangibility three years prior to the application of LTV ratio cap.20
LTVc,t a dummy variable that equals to 1 in the year(s) when LTV ratio cap is
in place in country c (see reference years given in Table 1.1). The interaction
variable is the simple multiplication of these two dummy variables.
I include µc,t that captures country-year fixed effects, µs,t that controls
sector-year fixed effects where sectors are classified according to four digit NACE
Revision 2 codes. µi capture firm-specific effects, and εi,s,c,t is the error term.
By using firm fixed effects I will be identifying solely from firm changes over
time. Therefore, I cannot identify the main effect of Collateral which is ab-
sorbed by firm fixed effects because Collateral is a predetermined firm-level
dummy variable. The level (direct) effect of policy shock to LTV ratio is ab-
sorbed by country-year fixed effects as other time fixed effects. Both sector-year
and country-year fixed effects will absorb the effects of any other industry and
country level shocks as well as the effects of any year.
In this specification, the coefficient of interest is β1. It captures the treatment
20Changes in collateral level from low to high in any years during LTV ratio cap is in place is
13 percent of observations. Collateral is a dummy variable that equals one if asset tangibility
is higher than 0.15 at any time during three years prior to the application of LTV ratio cap.
0.15 corresponds to the median of the distribution of asset tangibility.
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effect of LTV ratio cap and equals the DD estimate. It multiplies the interaction
term, which can be interpreted as dummy variable equal to one for the firms
who are exposed to the treatment when LTV ratio cap is in place. Given the
fact that the LTV ratio policy affects the firms with differential collateral values
differently, the coefficient β1 allows one to measure before-after shock difference
in the corresponding debt measure in firms with high collateral value relative
to before-after shock difference in firms with collateral value.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Reconciling Results with Firm Capital Structure
Literature
In this section, I first would like to verify that my results are consistent with
those of existing papers studying the determinants of firm capital structure de-
cisions. Using a comprehensive panel data that consists of both large firms and
SMEs, I revisit stylized capital structure regressions. This exercise represents
an important attempt because existing evidence bases mostly on the sample of
large publicly traded firms operating in developed countries. Then, I estimate
Equation (1.1) without LTV interaction:
yi,s,c,t = β1X i,s,c,t + µc,t + µs,t + µi + εi,s,c,t, (1.2)
where the indices i,s,c,t denote a firm, a sector, a country and a year, respec-
tively. I use different debt measures as dependent variables: TotDebt, FinDebt,
FinDebtTOL, and TC. X is a matrix containing standard control variables: Col-
lateral, Sales Growth, Profitability, Size, Inventory, Cash, and Age (see section
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1.3.2 for further details on the construction of variables).
The above Equation (1.1) includes fixed effects. Specifically, firm fixed effects
will control for unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity across firms. Industry-
year fixed effects at four-digit-level sector codes will absorb time-varying sector
specific conditions. Country-year fixed effects will absorb time-varying country
specific conditions. As mentioned earlier, since most of the aggregate demand
fluctuations derive from country- and industry-specific factors, not from firm-
specific factors, country-, industry-year fixed effects will also absorb fluctuations
in aggregate demand that might drive the relationship between firm debt financ-
ing decisions and any firm controls.
Tables 1.9–1.10 report the estimation results. In order to see whether unob-
served heterogeneity drives the results or not, I firstly estimate Equation (1.2)
without firm- and industry fixed effects. I use standard leverage measure i.e.,
TotDebt in the regressions. Columns (1)–(3) show that the estimators pass
“fixed-effects stress tests” of Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) because all
firm-level controls are still statistically significant after the inclusion of fixed
effects.21 This result verifies that traditional determinants in capital structure
decisions have ability in explaining the variation of leverage both in cross section
and within the firm in the time series.
As noted in Section 1.3.2, there are differences in the composition of total
debt, so the type of firm debt analyzed should base on the objective of the
analysis. The objective of this analysis is to investigate how changes in firm
21Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) argue that the traditional firm-level controls in
capital structure decisions become largely insignificant in explaining the variation in firm
leverage when the model accounts for time invariant firm effects.
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collateral are related to changes in firm capital structure decisions. The compo-
nents of debt have different relationship with firm collateral, for example trade
credit use is higher in firms with low levels of pledgable assets whereas debt use
from financial institutions is higher in firms with high levels of pledgable assets.
Therefore, I estimate Equation (1.2) individually for different debt measures.
Columns (3)–(6) correspond to debt measures i.e., total debt (TotDebt),
total debt excluding trade credit (FinDebtTOL), total debt excluding trade
credit and total other liabilities (FinDebt), and trade credit (TC), respectively.
As dependent variables in the estimation, they are all normalized by total assets.
Further details on the composition of debt measures are given in Section A.2 22
The results mirror previous work on related literature. The positive and
statistically significant coefficient on “Collateral” in Columns (3)–(5) suggest
that if a large fraction of a firm’s assets are tangible, those assets can be pledged
as collateral diminishing the risk of agency costs on debt. Therefore, firms can
issue more debt given the lenders be more willing to supply funds. On the
other hand, negative coefficient on collateral in Column (6) suggests that trade
credit use is lower in firms with higher levels of collateral.23 Trade credit is an
expensive form of finance, so firms with higher levels of collateral appear to use
22As it can be inferred from Table 1.6, there is a significant number of zero observations in
terms of bank loans (both short-term and long-term financial loans i.e., STFinDebt, LTFinD-
ebt). In case FinDebt is used as dependent variable in the estimation, the dependent variable
is censored from left, and thus Tobit model would be rather an appropriate one. However,
within a Tobit model, I cannot control for µi and µs,t by means of a dummy variable ap-
proach (incidental parameters problem), and no Tobit model analogous to the “fixed-effects”
Logit estimation exists. Honoré (1992) has proposed a “fixed effects” Tobit estimation that
does not impose distributional assumptions. However, it is hard to implement, and partial
effects can not be estimated. I therefore do not try his approach. Alternatively, I estimate
Tobit model of benchmark leverage regression only with country dummies and compare it
with simple pooled OLS. The inferences from these two models are similar.
23Trade credit is negatively correlated with collateral levels, supporting the implications of
the theoretical model developed in Cunat (2007).
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more from other sources of finance.
According to the results, more profitable firms have lower debt of any form,
consistent with theoretical predictions in the literature. According to pecking
order theory, firms prefer internal funds rather than debt since internal funds
have no adverse selection problem (Myers and Majluf (1984)). In other words,
highly profitable firms use less debt (more internal equity).
Further, I find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on Sales
Growth, suggesting that growing firms use higher debt of all types in order
to take advantage of investment opportunities they face. This finding follows
Kalemli-Ozcan, Laeven, and Moreno (2015). Using a comprehensive sample of
European firms24, they show that in the run-up to the crisis, a typical Euro-
pean firm increasingly issues debt to utilize profitable investment opportunities
(proxied by Sales Growth). The relevant literature is not able to find such a
positive relationship between investment opportunities and debt financing. The
existing papers mostly utilize Compustat data, representing only a typical large
publicly traded company in US, thus fail to provide evidence on SME finance.
Firm size has been empirically found to be positively related to capital struc-
ture. Most of the studies in the literature use cross-sectional variation and inter-
pret the positive coefficient on “Size” as larger firms are highly leveraged. How-
ever, in this paper, I use within-firm variation and interpret the same coefficient
as firms get bigger, they increase debt. The results show a positive coefficient
for all types of debt except TotDebt and FinDebtTOL (Columns (3)–(4)). As
noted in Section 1.3.2, these two measures are the most comprehensive debt
24The structure of their sample is similar to the one I use in this paper since their sample
is constructed based on ORBIS–AMADEUS, as in this paper.
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measures due to the inclusion of total other liabilities (TOL). This account in-
cludes items like income tax payable, social expenditure payable, pension fund
provisions, which are used for other purposes rather than financing, thus the
extent of such items in these two measures might affect the relationship.
I also study the usage of trade credit within firms by including additional
control variables. The result in column (6) shows that firms use more trade
credit when they have higher level of inventories, reflecting a positive correla-
tion between firm activity and trade credit use. The result on the “Inventory”
variable also could be related to the use of inventories as collateral. The nega-
tive coefficient on “Cash” variable suggests that firms increase trade credit use
when they face additional liquidity needs.25
The first two columns provide results where age is also an explanatory vari-
able in benchmark capital structure equation. In all other regressions, age is
not available because it is a firm specific linear time trend, and is absorbed by
firm and year fixed effects. Given the caveat in interpreting the coefficient on
age in the regressions without firm fixed effects, the negative coefficient on age
suggests that as firms age, they issue more equity, but less debt.
The economic effects of firm-level determinants of capital structure decisions
are reported in square brackets under standard errors in columns (3)–(6) of
Tables 1.9–1.10. The relevant percentages highlight the economic importance
of firm controls as determinants of firm debt, indeed collateral (proxied by
asset tangibility) appears to be the key determinant of debt of any form. For
25In unreported results, I rerun column (6) by including the measures of short-term financial
debt (e.g., STFinDebt and STFinDebtSTOL). The negative coefficients on those measures
show that firms use more trade credit when they have lower level of short-term finance in
other forms i.e. bank loans, reflecting that trade credit can serve as a substitute for short-
term financial debt.
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example, in column (4), the economic effect of collateral is displayed in terms of
percentage change in debt to its sample mean as each regressor increases from
the 25th to the 75th percentile (1-IQR change), while all other variables are
kept at their sample mean. To be precise, a 1-IQR change in firm collateral
leads debt (measured by FinDebtTOL) to increase by 0.089, which is a 17.43%
increase relative to the sample mean debt of 0.51.
1.5.2 Collateral and Firm Leverage: The Impact of LTV
Ratio Cap Policy
As discussed in Section 1.4 in detail, my hypothesis is that if LTV ratio cap
is effective in curbing borrowers’ demand by tightening borrowers’ capacity to
borrow, this will have a negative effect on real estate prices, then firms who had
higher valued collateral pre-LTV policy shock should experience a bigger drop
after-LTV policy shock in their secured borrowing relative to firms who had
lower valued collateral pre-LTV policy shock. In order to test this hypothesis,
I estimate Equation (1.1).
Table 1.11 shows the main results. According to the results in column (1), I
find a significant collateral damage effect on firm leverage (TotDebt) after LTV
ratio cap. This effect is different for firms with differential collateral values: LTV
ratio cap decreased leverage in firms with high collateral value by 0.9 percentage
point more than in firms with low collateral value.
In order to fully assess the impact of collateral damage on firms’ financing
decisions, all sources of external finance must be considered. One type of lending
might substitute for another type of lending, one type of lender might substitute
for another type of lender. Trade credit usage is immanent. As shown in
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Table 1.12, with the exception of Hungary, trade credit accounts for at least
roughly one-fourth of the total debt of a representative firm and about one-
third of the short-term debt. Second, besides trade credit, alternative sources
of finance are mostly unavailable to firms of the European countries that I focus
on: the development of the stock and bond markets is modest. To be more
precise, Figures 1.5–1.6 show the composition of financial liabilities of corporate
sector for some European countries I focus on. The percentages are based
on official statistics I obtain from Eurostat. According to these percentages,
two meaningful sources of external finance are financial loans and trade credit,
whereas the proportion of bonds in firm finance is limited. Then, did firms that
experienced a collateral damage after LTV ratio cap turn to trade credit as an
alternative source of finance?
To the extent that credit to firms are more likely to be rationed by financial
institutions, the impact of collateral damage (as a consequence of LTV ratio
cap) will be magnified, and the net impact will be determined by the extent
to which trade credit use offsets financial credit. According to the results in
columns (2)–(3), collateral damage caused debt use on secured basis to decrease
in firms with high collateral value by 1.2 percentage points more than in firms
with low collateral value, whereas it caused trade credit use to increase in firms
with high collateral value by 0.2 percentage points more than in firms with low
collateral value.
Columns (5)–(6) correspond to the debt measures divided by total debt
as the dependent variable. The evolution of these variables show the relative
changes with respect to other debt sources. The results suggest that LTV ratio
cap decreased the proportion of secured debt use (FinDebtTOL) in total debt
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in firms with high collateral values by 0.5 percentage point more than in firms
with low collateral values, whereas it increased the proportion of trade credit use
(TC) in total debt in firms with high collateral values by 0.5 percentage point
more than in firms with low collateral values. In combination, these results
verify the predictions I just stated above.
Does the amount of cash on hand influence trade credit use in the years when
LTV ratio cap is in place? If a firm views trade credit as an alternative but
expensive source of finance, I should find cash-rich firms increase trade credit to
a smaller extent. Therefore, I estimate Equation (1.1) using cash as an indicator
of liquidity to test this hypothesis. Cash is a predetermined firm-level dummy
which bases on the ratio of cash holding to total assets three years prior to the
application of LTV ratio cap.26 The pre-LTV level of cash is absorbed by firm
fixed effects, and thus I can only observe the differential responses to LTV ratio
cap. The results reported in columns (4) and (7) suggest that cash-rich firms
increase their reliance on credit from suppliers to a smaller extent in the years
when LTV cap is in place.
As shown in Table A.6 in the appendix, results are not driven by entry and
exit into the sample, and are robust to consider a continuous sample of firms
(see Section 1.3.1 for details on the construction of permanent sample). In
Table 1.13, I also conduct a placebo test using years prior to LTV ratio cap as
the policy years (Bulgaria: 2002–2003, Hungary: 2005–2006, The Netherlands:
2005–2006, Norway: 2008–2009, Sweden: 2005–2006, and Turkey: 2008–2009)
and I cannot find that firms change their debt financing decisions as they do
26Cash is a firm-level dummy variable that equals one if the ratio of cash holdings to total
assets is higher than 0.34 at any time during three years prior to the application of LTV ratio
cap. 0.34 corresponds to the 75th of the distribution of this variable.
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after-LTV policy shock.
1.5.3 Collateral and Firm Leverage: Average Effects by
Different Size Deciles
So far I work with a linear specification to identify the impact of asset tangibility
on firm debt financing. This specification delivers useful insights for the average
firm in the sample. However, there are issues I need to account for while studying
firm capital structure. As mentioned earlier, the industrial structure of the
economies studied in this paper are tilted toward SMEs (see e.g., Table 1.3)
and SME finance is more complex than large firm finance (Berger and Udell
(1998), Berger and Udell (2006)).27 For this reason, I turn to a specification
where the effect of firm collateral on debt is estimated nonlinearly. This is done
with a regression of the form:
yi,s,c,t = β1Collaterali,s,c,t +
10∑
k=2




+ +β21X i,s,c,t + µc,t + µs,t + µi + εi,s,c,t, (1.3)
where the indices i,s,c,t denote a firm, a sector, a country and a year, respec-
tively. X is a matrix containing standard control variables: Sales Growth,
Profitability, Size. Dk,t is a time-varying dummy variable that takes value 1
for all firms that fall in decile k of the size distribution in the given year t. In
27For example, the finance of very small firms with no track record and no collateral rely
on insider funds (from start-up team, family, friends), trade credit and/or angel finance. As
firms grow and accumulate collateral and track record, they access to intermediated finance
from both equity and debt markets (i.e venture capital and loans from financial institutions).
Large firms of known risk and track record issue commercial paper and/or obtain funds from
public equity and debt markets in addition to loans from financial institutions.
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this way, collateral effect is estimated separately for each size class. Further,
Dk,t should be interpreted as size-year fixed effects will control for all the time
varying differences between firms of different size.
Table 1.14 corresponds to dependent variables i.e. FinDebt, FinDebtTOL,
and TC. Collateral×size decile=k is the additional effect of collateral over and
above the baseline effect for first decile firms captured by the variable collateral
where Collateral is the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets. All these
effects are reported in the first columns. Latter columns report the overall effect
of collateral for a firm of decile k. The corresponding p-value from an F test
with the null hypothesis that this effect is zero is given in the square parentheses
in bold.
For secured debt obligations (FinDebt, FinDebtTOL), the results show that
the impact of asset tangibility on debt capacity is pronounced across all firms of
different sizes, but less pronounced across very small and large firms. This find-
ing follows the conventional wisdom. Large firms are typically old, reputable,
and less vulnerable to imperfections in credit markets, and hence they borrow
with higher LTV ratios (lower collateral) in private debt markets since lenders
generally consider them as low-risk borrowers.28 For example, Berger and Udell
(1998, 1995) with US data show that loans to low-risk borrowers are less likely
to be collateralized. Similarly, Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006) with Spanish
data provide direct evidence of negative association between collateral and a
borrower’s risk.
28In the sample, on average, large firms are 28,5 years old whereas the others in the lower
deciles are 14,6 years old. The difference between these means is significant at the 1 percent
level.
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The results for very small firms29 suggest that the interpretation of the
role of asset tangibility in determination of firms’ borrowing capacity should
be done with caution: asset tangibility does not inversely measure the extent
of financing constraints, but rather measures firms’ ability to pledge collateral.
Firms’ ability to pledge collateral increases firms’ borrowing capacity to the
extent that tangible assets on firms’ balance sheet are liquid (e.g., Campello
and Giambona (2013)).
Finally, columns (5) and (6) correspond to unsecured debt obligations (TC).
The results show that the impact of asset tangibility on debt capacity is pro-
nounced across all firms of different sizes. However, I do not observe a strong
cross-sectional variation as I do in case of secured borrowing. The results sug-
gest that firm heterogeneity (captured by firm size) does not play a strong role
in determining trade credit use in firms with similar collateral on their balance
sheet. This finding can be explained by the possibility that trade creditors act
as “relationship lenders.” Trade creditors have proprietary information about
their customers and they are better positioned to repossess and resell the sup-
plied goods (e.g., Mian and Smith (1992), McMillan and Woodruff (1999)), thus
trade creditors might have an advantage over other lenders in providing credit
to firms of all sizes including SMEs.
29The firms in bottom deciles (up to 7th decile) correspond to the majority of micro enter-
prises (0–9 employees), whereas the firms in the middle deciles (7th–9th deciles) correspond
to the majority of SMEs (10–249 employees) in the sample. Furthermore, the firms in the
bottom deciles are on average younger (13,6 years old) than the firms in the middle deciles
(18,5 years old). The difference between these means is significant at the 1 percent level.
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1.5.4 Collateral and Firm Leverage: Heterogenous Re-
sponses to LTV Ratio Cap Policy
In light of the results I discussed in the previous section, my hypothesis is that
if the impact of asset tangibility on debt capacity is less pronounced across very
small and large firms, I argue that firms of medium size deciles (“SME”) should
experience a bigger drop in their secured borrowing relative to firms of bottom
and top size deciles (“VerySmall–Large”) who had similar collateral damage on
their balance sheet after-LTV policy shock.
In order to test this hypothesis, I turn to a triple differences-in-differences
specification. I justify this specification by the use of medium-year fixed effects
that capture all time varying differences between “SME” firms and “VerySmall–
Large” firms. The estimation:
yi,s,c,t = β1SMEi,s,c × Collaterali,s,c × LTVc,t
+ β2Collaterali,s,c × LTVc,t + β2Xi,s,c,t
+ µsme,t + µc,t + µs,t + µi + εi,s,c,t, (1.4)
where the indices i,s,c,t denote a firm, a sector, a country and a year, respec-
tively. X is a matrix containing standard control variables (Sales Growth, Prof-
itability, Size for TotDebt and FinDebtTOL; Sales Growth, Profitability, Size,
Inventory and Cash for TC). To avoid selection concerns, I also use predeter-
mined firm-level dummy to define “SME” firms.30 µsme,t are sme-year fixed
30SME equals one if the given firm’s size (measured by logarithm of real total assets.) is
between 75th–95th percentiles of the distribution at any time during the three years prior to
the introduction of LTV ratio cap.
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effects.
Triple interaction term in Equation (1.4) turns out to be important for iden-
tification. To see why, I compare the interpretation of coefficients in Equa-
tion (1.1) to those of Equation (1.4). In Equation (1.1), β1 captures the treat-
ment effect of LTV ratio cap for typical firm holding high level of collateral.
This is not the case for β1 in Equation (1.4) because now this coefficient reflects
the treatment effect only for a typical “SME” firm with similar collateral value.
Therefore, to understand how the treatment effect of LTV ratio cap varies with
firm size, one should the compare β1 to β2. For example, β1 compared to β2
would be the incremental effect of being “SME” firms during the year(s) in
which LTV ratio cap is in place.
Table 1.15 reports the estimation results. The results verify the validity
of the hypothesis stated above. For example, the results in column (1) show
that LTV ratio cap decreased leverage in “SME” firms with high collateral
value by 1.2 percentage points more than in “VerySmall–Large” firms with high
collateral value. However, firms of different size did not behave differently in
terms of trade credit use after they experienced a collateral damage (e.g., in
column (3), β2 is very small i.e., -0.0002). Table 1.16 shows that the results are
not driven by “Large”31 firms, and are robust to the exclusion of large firms.
1.5.5 Aggregate Implications
The results presented in the previous sections suggest a significant collateral
damage effect on firms’ debt financing decisions after the LTV policy shock.
In this section, I will conduct a back-of-the-envelope calculation to link micro
31“Large” firms refer to firms of top size deciles.
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estimates I obtained from the difference-in-difference estimation to the actual
corporate leverage patterns observed in the aggregate data. Doing so, if there
observed a decline in aggregate corporate leverage after the LTV policy shock,
I will thus be able to gauge how the collateral damage effect contributed to this
decline.
To construct aggregate measures, I use official statistics from Eurostat.
Eurostat provides country-level balance sheets that have information on non-
financial assets, financial assets and financial liabilities. However, the balance
sheets I obtain from Eurostat are structured differently than the firm-level bal-
ance sheets I use in my analysis. In order to precisely compare the firm-level
measures from ORBIS–AMADEUS data with the aggregate measures from Eu-
rostat data, I work on the correspondence of the accounts from these two data
sets in detail. 32
I cannot proceed with the analysis of aggregate implications of LTV policy
using the pooled sample of six European countries since Eurostat lacks informa-
tion for some countries.33 Then, I proceed with the analysis of Sweden, which
has a better coverage in both data sets. I rewrite Equation (1.1) using bench-
mark leverage measure i.e. TotDebt (the ratio of total debt to total assets):
32Statistics on financial balance sheets come from Eurostat. To construct “Total Finan-
cial Liabilities” for non-financial corporations, I sum of F3: “Securities other than shares,”
F4: “Loans,” “F6:Insurance premiums”, and F7: “Other accounts receivable/payable.”
This summation would correspond to “TotDebt” in ORBIS–AMADEUS. Next, to con-
struct “Total Assets,” I sum of F AS: “Financial Assets,” and T11: “Total Fixed Assets,
(net).” This summation would correspond to “TOAS” in ORBIS–AMADEUS. See http:
//ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database?node_code=nasa_f_bs for further details.
33For instance, Eurostat does not provide information on non-financial assets for Bulgaria,
Norway and Turkey, which prevents me from computing aggregate total assets.
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TotDebti,s,t = β1Collaterali,s × LTVt + β2Xi,s,t + µi + µs,t + εi,s,t, (1.5)
where the indices i,s,t denote a firm, a sector and a year, respectively. X is a
matrix containing standard control variables: Sales Growth, Profitability, Size.
In order to sum of collateral damage effect across all Swedish firms (without
grouping them based on their collateral values), I first use Collateral as contin-
uous firm-level variable, which is defined by the ratio of tangible fixed assets to
total assets. Second, to avoid concerns that the share of tangible fixed assets in
total assets might have been changed as a consequence of the policy, I compute
firm-level average of this ratio for the 1998–2007 period that excludes all three
years prior the introduction of LTV ratio cap in 2010. In the estimation, I can-
not identify the main effect of Collateral because Collateral is measured by the
firm-level average ratio of tangible assets to total assets, which is absorbed by
firm fixed effects. The level (direct) effect of the LTV policy shock is absorbed
by country-year fixed effects as other time fixed effects. Sector-year fixed effects
will absorb the effects of any other industry shocks as well as the effects of any
year.
Third, I sort all firms in ascending order based on Collateral. I denote the
before-after LTV policy shock difference in firm leverage as ∆TotDebti,s. Then,
based on Equation (1.5), the difference in the before-after LTV policy difference
in firm leverage in two consecutive firms is expressed in the below:
∆TotDebti,s −∆TotDebti−1,s = β1(Collaterali,s − Collaterali−1,s), (1.6)






where ωi,s indicates the share of tangible fixed assets of firm i in aggregate tan-
gible fixed assets.34 The empirical methodology I use estimates the differential
effect of the LTV policy shock across firms with different collateral values. In
order to pin down the level effect of this policy shock, I assume that the before-
after LTV policy shock difference in firm leverage equals zero for the firm with
the lowest collateral value. Then, I have this equality:
∆TotDebti,s = β1(Collaterali,s − Collateral0) for i > 0, (1.8)
Thus, I find the lower bound of aggregate effect of LTV policy shock on firm




ωi,s(Collaterali,s − Collateral0). (1.9)
According to the estimation results of Equation (1.5), β1 equals to -0.032
(see Table 1.17). Further, based on calculations, second term in RHS of equa-
tion (1.9) equals to 0.026. Then, aggregate effect of the LTV ratio cap in Swedish
corporate sector is -0.08% (=-0.032*0.026).
34Statistics on the components total non-financial assets come from Eurostat. They are dis-
aggregated by industry based on NACE Revision 2. Before, summing the values over sectors, I
exclude non-overlapping sectors that are not used in the analysis: K: “ Financial and insurance
activities,” L: “Real estate activities,” T: “Activities of households as employers; undifferen-
tiated goods- and services-producing activities of households for own use,” and “U: Activities
of extraterritorial organisations and bodies.” To construct “Tangible Fixed Assets (Net),” I




Based on aggregate statistics from Eurostat, I compute the average before-
after LTV policy shock difference in aggregate corporate leverage (i.e., the ratio
of aggregate corporate financial liabilities to aggregate corporate assets)35 over
the 1998–2013 period. It equals to -0.5% (=0.351-0.356). Thus, the LTV ra-
tio cap that resulted in collateral damage explains 16% (=0.08%/0.5%) of the
decline in aggregate corporate leverage.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates how firms’ capital structure decisions respond to changes
in the value of firm collateral, caused by real estate price shock. Through the
collateral channel, shocks to the value of real estate can have a significant impact
on the firms’ borrowing capacity. I provide evidence on this mechanism by using
LTV ratio caps on mortgages in a number of European countries as policy shocks
that affect real estate prices. In my empirical analysis, I conduct a difference-in-
difference exercise using a unique and comprehensive micro panel data covering
both large firms and SMEs. This allows me to better identify and quantify the
effects of policy shocks to the value of firm collateral by distinguishing them from
local demand shocks and local general equilibrium effects. I find a significant
collateral damage effect on firms’ debt financing decisions: the LTV policy shock
caused secured debt to decrease in firms with high collateral value more than
in firms with low collateral value.
Further, I investigate how shocks to the value of firm collateral affect firms’
choice between secured and unsecured debt financing. I find that firms that
experienced a collateral damage after the LTV policy shock turned to trade
35See footnote 31 for details on the construction of this ratio.
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credit as an alternative source of finance: collateral damage caused trade credit
use to increase in firms with high collateral value more than in firms with low
collateral value. These findings document a new evidence on how firms adjust
to collateral shocks through trade credit use.
I believe that this paper has important implications on the role of collat-
eral channel in transmitting boom-bust cycles in real estate markets to the
corporate sector. The inclusion of SMEs in the analysis is crucial given the
structure of European economies. Europe consists of bank-dominant economies
tilted toward externally dependent SMEs. Among all sources of external fi-
nance, European firms typically prefer debt issuing to finance working capital
and/or fixed capital. European banks heavily prefer real-estate as collateral
especially for SMEs. Hence, SMEs are highly dependent on real estate assets
to access external finance, causing an intimate link between collateral shocks
and the aggregate economy. In order to minimize dependency of SME finance
on collateral pledging, and broaden SMEs’ access to external finance, policy
makers should develop alternative policies. For example, SME loan guarantee
schemes might enable SMEs to borrow more than would otherwise be possible
based on collateral they can pledge. Such policies might then help mitigating
the aggregate effects of collateral damage caused by real estate price shock.
This paper also highlights that macroprudential policies in one sector–such
as LTV ratio caps on mortgages targeting household sector–might result in an
unintended consequence in another sector–such as collateral damage in corpo-
rate sector. This is an important caveat that policy makers should consider
when implementing macroprudential policy.
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Table 1.2: Coverage in Total Economy Based on Gross Output
YEAR BG HU NL NO SE
1999 0.79 0.17 0.63 0.52
2000 0.84 0.21 0.63 0.56
2001 0.71 0.2 0.77 0.6
2002 0.57 0.73 0.22 0.79 0.63
2003 0.6 0.66 0.21 0.65 0.65
2004 0.79 0.76 0.22 0.67 0.67
2005 0.83 0.8 0.23 0.69 0.68
2006 0.84 0.81 0.25 0.67 0.71
2007 0.91 0.79 0.25 0.71 0.7
2008 0.94 0.75 0.28 0.59 0.73
2009 0.92 0.87 0.31 0.78 0.87
2010 0.96 0.76 0.35 0.79 0.88
2011 0.88 0.72 0.3 0.72 0.82
2012 0.88 0.82 0.28 0.67 0.76
Notes: Table 1.2 presents the ratios that are calculated based on gross output. The total
sample consists of firms that report data with positive values of the corresponding measure (i.e.
gross-output). The country codes within these classifications are as follows: BG (Bulgaria),
HU (Hungary), NL (Netherlands), NO (Norway), HU (Hungary) and SE (Sweden). BvD
provides firm-level information on gross-output for all sectors of a given European country
between 1999–2012, however Eurostat SBS data provides information on gross output with
the exceptions of some sectors. So, for a given country-year, total economy percentages
are computed by taking the ratio of aggregated gross output values where aggregated gross
output is computed by totalling gross output over these sectors for which gross-output related
variable is available in both data sets. For further details on the construction of percentages,
see Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, Villegas-Sanchez, Volosovych, and Yesiltas (2015).
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Table 1.3: Size Distribution in terms of Total Economy, 2010
BG HU NL NO SE TR
Panel A: Eurostat SBS
Micro 91.2 94.6 93.6 91.6 94.5 n.a.
SMEs 8.6 5.2 6.2 8.2 5.4 n.a.
Large 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 n.a.
BG HU NL NO SE TR
Panel B: ORBIS–AMADEUS
Micro 90.9 77.7 84.8 91.2 91.2 47.9
SMEs 8.9 21.6 14.7 8.2 8.2 46.4
Large 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 5.7
Notes: In Table 1.3, each cell corresponds to the share of indicated size category’s number
of firms in total economy from the relevant data source for the given country in 2010 (%).
Number of firms is summed over overlapping sectors with Eurostat SBS data. In each panel,
the first three rows report the percentages from ORBIS-AMADEUS and the next three rows
are the same percentages from Eurostat’s SBS data. Each column is a different country with
the following codes: BG (Bulgaria), NL (Netherlands), NO (Norway), HU (Hungary), RO
(Romania), SE (Sweden), and TR (Turkey). Micro corresponds to firms with employees less
than 10, SMEs corresponds Small and Medium Enterprises with employees between 10 and
249, and Large corresponds to firms with 250 employees or more. For further details on the



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.9: Firm Capital Structure Regressions
Sample: Full, 1997–2013
Dep. Var.: TotDebt TotDebt TotDebt FinDebtTOL FinDebt TC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Collateral 0.156*** 0.160*** 0.157*** 0.225*** 0.281*** -0.080***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
[ 6.58%] [11.47%] [56.20%] [ -18.91%]
[10.00%] [17.43%] [85.38%] [-28.15%]
Profitability -0.567*** -0.536*** -0.352*** -0.274*** -0.092*** -0.068***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
[-10.79%] [-10.21%] [-13.45%] [-11.13 %]
[-10.33%] [-9.78%] [-12.88%] [-11.31%]
Sales Growth 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.043*** 0.026*** 0.003*** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.01) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
[3.26%] [2.40%] [1.08%] [7.11 %]
[1.87%] [1.38%] [0.62%] [4.17%]
Size -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.009*** -0.013*** 0.032*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
[-2.32%] [-4.08%] [39.38%] [4.36 %]













Table 1.10: (Cont’d.) Firm Capital Structure Regressions
Sample: Full, 1997–2013
Dep. Var.: TotDebt TotDebt TotDebt FinDebtTOL FinDebt TC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Observations 1,555,196 1,555,196 1,581,186 1,581,186 1,581,186 1,513,978
R2 0.17 0.21 0.82 0.77 0.81 0.77
Firm Fixed-Effects no no yes yes yes yes
Sector Fixed-Effects no yes no no no no
Country Fixed-Effects yes yes no no no no
Year Fixed-Effects yes yes no no no no
Sector×year Fixed-Effects no no yes yes yes yes
Country×year Fixed-Effects no no yes yes yes yes
Notes: Tables 1.9–1.10 report the results of the estimation of Equation (1.2). The dependent
variables are different debt measures i.e., TotDebt, FinDebtTOL, FinDebt, and TC. They are
defined as follows. TotDebt: The sum of short-term and long-term debt; FinDebtTOL: Total
debt excluding trade credit; FinDebt: Total debt excluding trade credit and other liabilities,
and TC: Trade Credit. Debt measures are all divided by total assets. Further details on the
composition of debt measures are given in Section A.2. Collateral is the ratio of total tangible
fixed assets to total assets. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Sales Growth
is the logarithmic change of real sales. Size is the logarithm of real total assets. Cash is
the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to book value of total assets. Inventory is the ratio of
total inventories (raw materials+in progress+finished goods) to total assets. Debt measures
are all divided by total assets. Sectors are classified according to four digit NACE Revision
2 codes. Standard errors are heteroskedastic-consistent errors adjusted for clustering across
observations of a given firm, and are reported in parentheses. The first figures in square
brackets under the t-statistics represent percentage changes in leverage relative to the sample
as each continuous regressor increases by its standard deviation, while all other regressors
are kept at their sample mean. In the same manner, the second figures in bold represent
percentage changes in leverage relative to the sample mean as each continuous regressor
increases from 25th to the 75th percentiles, while all other regressors are kept at their sample











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.14: Collateral and Firm Debt: Average Sensitivity by Size
Deciles
Sample: Full, 1997–2013
Dependent Variable: FinDebt FinDebtTOL TC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Collateral 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.094*** 0.094*** -0.036*** -0.036***
(0.004) [0.00] (0.007) [0.00] (0.003) [0.00]
Collateral×s.d. = 2 0.070*** 0.185*** -0.002 0.092*** -0.017*** -0.053***
(0.004) [0.00] (0.01) [0.00] (0.003) [0.00]
Collateral×s.d. = 3 0.113*** 0.228*** 0.016** 0.110*** -0.031*** -0.067***
(0.004) [0.00] (0.008) [0.00] (0.003) [0.00]
Collateral×s.d. = 4 0.152*** 0.267*** 0.040*** 0.134*** -0.042*** -0.078***
(0.005) [0.00] (0.008) [0.00] (0.003) [0.00]
Collateral×s.d. = 5 0.191*** 0.304*** 0.072*** 0.166*** -0.051*** -0.087***
(0.005) [0.00] (0.008) [0.00] (0.003) [0.00]
Collateral×s.d. = 6 0.223*** 0.336*** 0.098*** 0.192*** -0.055*** -0.091***
(0.005) [0.00] (0.008) [0.00] (0.003) [0.00]
Collateral×s.d. = 7 0.242*** 0.355*** 0.112*** 0.206*** -0.059*** -0.095***
(0.005) [0.00] (0.008) [0.00] (0.003) [0.00]
Collateral×s.d. = 8 0.246*** 0.359*** 0.110*** 0.204*** -0.061*** -0.097***
(0.005) [0.00] (0.01) [0.00] (0.003) [0.00]
Collateral×s.d. = 9 0.237*** 0.350*** 0.093*** 0.187*** -0.057*** -0.093***
(0.005) [0.00] (0.008) [0.00] (0.003) [0.00]
Collateral×s.d. = 10 0.147*** 0.138*** 0.006 0.100*** -0.035*** -0.071***
(0.008) [0.00] (0.01) [0.00] (0.004) [0.00]
Firm Controls yes yes yes
Number of observations 1,581,186 1,581,186 1,581,186
R2 0.77 0.72 0.77
Firm Fixed-Effects yes yes yes
Size decile×year Fixed-Effects yes yes yes
Sector×year Fixed-Effects yes yes yes
Country×year Fixed-Effects yes yes yes
Notes: Table 1.14 reports the results of the estimation of Equation (1.3). The dependent
variables are different debt measures i.e. FinDebtTOL, FinDebt, and TC. They are defined
as follows. FinDebtTOL: Total debt excluding trade credit; FinDebt: Total debt excluding
trade credit and other liabilities, and TC: Trade Credit. Debt measures are all divided by
total assets. Further details on the composition of debt measures are given in Section A.2.
Collateral is the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets. Collateral×s.d.=k is the ad-
ditional effect of Collateral over and above the baseline effect for first decile firms captured
by the variable Collateral, and are reported in the first columns. Latter columns report the
overall effect of Collateral for a firm of decile k. The corresponding p-value from an F test
with the null hypothesis that this effect is zero is given in the square parentheses in bold.
The regression is run with decile specific time-varying time trends (an interaction of the size
decile dummy and time trend). See Tables 1.9–1.10 for other details.
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Table 1.15: Differential Impact of LTV Ratio cap
Sample: Full, 1997–2013
Dependent Variable: TotDebt FinDebtTOL TC FinDebtTOL TC
(divided by total assets) (divided by total debt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SME×Collateral×LTV -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.0002 -0.003** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Collateral×LTV -0.006*** -0.010*** 0.003*** -0.005*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 1,581,186 1,581,186 1,513,978 1,581,186 1,513,978
R2 0.81 0.8 0.77 0.74 0.73
Firm Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes
SME×year Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Sector×year Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Country×year Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes
F-test
Collateral×LTV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Table 1.15 reports the results of the estimation of Equation (1.4). The dependent
variables are different debt measures i.e., TotDebt, FinDebtTOL, and TC. They are defined
as follows. TotDebt: The sum of short-term and long-term debt; FinDebtTOL: Total debt
excluding trade credit, and TC: Trade Credit. Debt measures are divided by total assets
and total liabilities in Columns 1–3 and Columns 4–5, respectively. Further details on the
composition of debt measures are given in Section A.2. LTV equals to 1 in the year(s) when
LTV ratio cap is in place in the corresponding country. Collateral is a dummy variable that
equals one if asset tangibility is higher than its median at any time during three years prior
to the application of LTV ratio cap. SME equals one if the given firm’s size (measured by
logarithm of real total assets) is between 75th–95th percentiles of the distribution at any time
during the three years prior to the introduction of LTV ratio cap. Firm controls are defined as
follows: Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Sales Growth is the logarithmic
change of real sales. Size is the logarithm of real total assets. Cash is the ratio of cash and
cash equivalents to book value of total assets. Inventory is the ratio of total inventories (raw
materials+in progress+finished goods) to total assets. Sectors are classified according to four
digit NACE Revision 2 codes. Standard errors are heteroskedastic-consistent errors adjusted
for clustering across observations of a given firm, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.16: Differential Impact of LTV Ratio cap; Excluding Large
Firms
Sample: Full, 1997–2013
Dependent Variable: TotDebt FinDebtTOL TC FinDebtTOL TC
(divided by total assets) (divided by total debt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SME×Collateral×LTV -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.0007 -0.003** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.01) (0.001) (0.001)
Collateral×LTV -0.006*** -0.010*** 0.003*** -0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Firm Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 1,496,146 1,496,146 1,429,489 1,496,146 1,429,489
R2 0.82 0.8 0.77 0.74 0.74
Firm Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes
SME×year Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Sector×year Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Country×year Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes
F-test
Collateral×LTV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Table 1.16 reports the results of the estimation of Equation (1.4). The dependent
variables are different debt measures i.e., TotDebt, FinDebtTOL, and TC. They are defined
as follows. TotDebt: The sum of short-term and long-term debt; FinDebtTOL: Total debt
excluding trade credit, and TC: Trade Credit. Debt measures are divided by total assets
and total liabilities in Columns 1–3 and Columns 4–5, respectively. Further details on the
composition of debt measures are given in Section A.2. LTV equals to 1 in the year(s) when
LTV ratio cap is in place in the corresponding country. Collateral is a dummy variable that
equals one if asset tangibility is higher than its median at any time during three years prior
to the application of LTV ratio cap. SME equals one if the given firm’s size (measured by
logarithm of real total assets) is between 75th–95th percentiles of the distribution at any time
during the three years prior to the introduction of LTV ratio cap. Firm controls are defined as
follows: Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Sales Growth is the logarithmic
change of real sales. Size is the logarithm of real total assets. Cash is the ratio of cash and
cash equivalents to book value of total assets. Inventory is the ratio of total inventories (raw
materials+in progress+finished goods) to total assets. Sectors are classified according to four
digit NACE Revision 2 codes. Standard errors are heteroskedastic-consistent errors adjusted
for clustering across observations of a given firm, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.17: The Impact of LTV Ratio Cap on Firm Debt Financing
Decisions; Sweden
Sample: Full, 1997–2013
Dependent Variable: TotDebt FinDebtTOL TC FinDebtTOL TC
(divided by total assets) (divided by total debt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Collateral×LTV -0.032*** -0.059*** 0.024*** -0.037*** 0.032***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 1,041,289 1,041,289 1,030,895 1,041,289 1,030,895
R2 0.80 0.76 0.74 0.70 0.70
Firm Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Sector×year Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Country×year Fixed-Effects yes yes yes yes yes
F-test
Collateral×LTV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Table 1.17 reports the results of the estimation of Equation (1.5). The dependent
variables are different debt measures i.e., TotDebt, FinDebtTOL, and TC. They are defined
as follows. TotDebt: The sum of short-term and long-term debt; FinDebtTOL: Total debt
excluding trade credit, and TC: Trade Credit. Debt measures are divided by total assets
and total liabilities in Columns 1–3 and Columns 4–5, respectively. Further details on the
composition of debt measures are given in Section A.2. LTV equals to 1 in the year(s) when
LTV ratio cap is in place in the corresponding country. Collateral is constructed as firm-level
average of the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets for the 1998–2007 period. Firm
controls are defined as follows: Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Sales
Growth is the logarithmic change of real sales. Size is the logarithm of real total assets. Cash
is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to book value of total assets. Inventory is the ratio
of total inventories (raw materials+in progress+finished goods) to total assets. Sectors are
classified according to four digit NACE Revision 2 codes. Standard errors are heteroskedastic-
consistent errors adjusted for clustering across observations of a given firm, and are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Figure 1.1: Transmission Channels of A Tightening of the LTV, LTI
and DSTI Limits
Source: Adapted from CGFS (2012)
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Bulgaria Mean: Before Policy
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Netherlands Mean: Before Policy
Mean: After Policy
(c) Source: OECD60












































































































































































































Sweden Mean: Before Policy
Mean: After Policy
Source: Statistics of Sweden
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Chapter 2
Financial Shocks in Production
Chains
2.1 Introduction
Production takes time, especially when conducted through long production
chains. The time dimension of production introduces a waiting period between
the point when a cost is incurred and when cash flow materializes. Working
capital provides the financial resources which fill this gap.
Our main hypothesis is that working capital is the “glue” that binds firms
together in a production chain. We address the financial counterparts of the
production relationships between firms as suppliers and customers in the pro-
duction chain. A firm’s accounts receivable are claims against customer firms in
the production chain—the downstream firms. The flip-side of this relationship
is that the downstream firms’ accounts payable is a liability of the firm backed
by its assets, including its own accounts receivable against customers yet further
down the chain. Drawing on the insights of Merton (1974), we may think of a
firm’s accounts payable as defaultable debt backed by its assets.
Accounts receivable and payable generate a chain of interlocking claims and
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obligations that bind the interests of the firms within the production chain.
Because accounts receivable are very junior claims their value is sensitive to
the financial strength of the debtor firm. When the final product generates
healthy cash flows, the value of accounts receivable as an asset will be high, to
the benefit of all the firms (directly and indirectly) in the production chain. In
effect, each firm is a stake-holder in the cash flows generated by the production
chain as a whole.
We use a multi-stage generalization of the moral hazard model of Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997) to develop three empirical hypotheses, which are then exam-
ined using a large data set of firms from OECD countries. The sample covers
the recent crisis period, and our focus is on the impact of financial shocks on
working capital.
The first hypothesis is that upstream firms (i.e. supplier firms) have higher
working capital compared to down-stream firms (final product firms). The
reason is that upstream firms are more remote from the direct consequences of
their actions. The time to produce and the more numerous intervening firms
in the chain entail a higher discount rate on costs and benefits of actions. In
order to elicit high effort, the upstream firm’s “skin in the game” must be larger
relative to revenues than for downstream firms. Net working capital serves as
the equity of the firm - its “skin in the game” - in the production chain.
The second, related hypothesis is that upstream firms’ working capital is
more sensitive to fluctuations in financial conditions than it is for downstream
firms. The intuition is that the market interest rate serves as the discount rate
that firms use to evaluate the costs and benefits of working capital. When
interest rates are high, the direct consequences of shirking become smaller due
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to the higher discount rates. Therefore, firms need to hold more equity–more
skin in the game–in order to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint.
There is, however, a sting in the tail, and this leads to our third hypothesis.
When the interest rate becomes too high, the viability of the production chain
itself becomes problematic, and the chain itself starts to unravel. We therefore
predict that the working capital of firms is non-monotonic with respect to the
interest rate. For low levels of the interest rate, working capital is increasing
in the interest rate, but beyond a threshold point, the working capital declines
with the interest rate. This is our third hypothesis.
Our questions bear on the recent paper by Bigio and LaO (2013), who have
examined the impact of financial frictions in production networks. Bigio and
LaO (2013) model financial frictions by introducing collateral constraints on
input purchases. Firms’ expenditures on inputs are constrained so that their
expenditure is less than a given fraction of their revenue. In a production chain,
downstream firms face a tighter constraint, as they must pay for intermediate
inputs as well as for labor and direct inputs. In contrast, our model imposes
tighter constraints on upstream firms. Bigio and LaO (2013) do not pose their
hypothesis directly in terms of balance sheet quantities, and so the implications
of their model for working capital would need to be developed separately. In this
context, one guiding question would be whether downstream firms or upstream
firms have higher working capital.
We use firm-level data from ORBIS, a commercial data set provided by
Bureau van Dijk (BvD), which contains administrative data on millions of firms
worldwide. The accounting information in ORBIS is initially collected by local
Chambers of Commerce and in turn, is relayed to BvD through some 40 different
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information providers. The data set provides financial and foreign ownership
information for each firm, starting in 2000. Our measure of “upstreamness”
draws on sectoral interlinkages from input-output matrices developed by Fally
(2011), Antràs, Chor, Fally, and Hillberry (2012) and Antràs and Chor (2013).
We find support for all three of our hypotheses. First, upstream firms hold
more working capital. Second, upstream firms display higher procyclicality
of working capital. As predicted by the model, firms that are higher up in
the production chain are more sensitive to fluctuations in the interest rate.
Finally, we estimate a quadratic relationship between working capital and the
interest rate and find that the estimates are consistent with the non-monotonic
relationship suggested by our third hypothesis.
The importance of production chains and complementarities are classic themes
in economics, with antecedents in Leontief (1936) and Hirschman (1958). In the
same spirit, development economists have studied the technological challenges
in sustaining complex production processes. The O-ring theory of Kremer
(1993) and the role of intermediate goods and complementarity discussed by
Ciccone (2002) and Jones (2011) are examples. As well as these technolog-
ical constraints, our focus is on the incentive structure of production chains.
One motivating example is the breakdown of production chains in the post-
Soviet economies in the 1990s. Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Marin and
Schnitzer (2005) attribute the drastic fall in output to hold-up problems and the
recursive nature of the rent-seeking along the production chain that undermined
pre-existing production chains of the Soviet-era command economy.
The mutual stakes held by firms in the production chain differ in important
ways from the cross-holding of shares. First, accounts receivable mirror exactly
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the production relationships within the chain. Cross-shareholding is a blunter
device that lag the shifts in the underlying production relationships. Second,
and more important, accounts receivable are held by upstream firms (often,
small and medium sized firms) against their downstream counterparts (final
goods manufacturers). This is in the opposite direction from the archetypal
picture of the large, final goods firm holding equity stakes in its smaller suppliers
in a vertically integrated production structure.
Our framework sheds light on a puzzle raised in the trade credit literature—
namely, why firms persist in maintaining large stocks of accounts payable, even
though some industries have substantial discounts for prompt cash settlement
(see the survey evidence in Ng, Smith, and Smith (1999). A common invoicing
practice among U.S. firms is the so-called “2-10 net 30” contract, meaning that
if the invoice is settled within ten days, there is a discount of 2%, and otherwise
the invoice must be paid within 30 days (without discount). The implied
annual interest rate for the additional 20 days of credit comes out is over 40%
and, everything else equal, it is hard to comprehend why a firm would borrow
at such a high rate of interest.
The statistics we obtain from Business Environment and Enterprise Perfor-
mance Survey of the World Bank provide additional evidence on the payment
terms of European firms.1 Those statistics in Table 2.2 suggest that most of
1World Bank compiles the corresponding establishment-level data by conducting mostly
face-to-face interviews, which are administered in roughly parallel fashion to enterprises in
selected European countries. The data set provides a basis for making country comparisons
of investment climate conditions, as well as comparisons of the severity of constraints affect-
ing firms and performing country-specific evaluations. It captures firm perceptions of key
constraints in the business environment, perceptions that shape operational and investment
decisions, as well as several quantitative indices of firm experience. For further details, see
Kalemli-Ozcan and Sørensen (2014).
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European firms prefer postponing their payments. To illustrate, 65 % of Ger-
man firms answered that none of their sales to customers in value terms over the
last 12 months were paid before the delivery of their products or services.2 In
the same manner, only 1 % of German firms answered that all of their sales to
customers in value terms over the last 12 months were paid before the delivery
of their products or services.
However, within our framework, a firm may have an incentive to maintain
accounts payable if early redemption raises the probability of failure for the chain
by lessening the incentives of upstream firms. If upstream firms (suppliers) paid
in advance then they might have a lower incentive in keeping the production
chain going. 3 We will show that the upstream firm has positive net receivables
so he is a net creditor.
Working capital is more familiar to the literature on financial crises, espe-
cially those in emerging economies. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006) doc-
ument several stylized facts which appear consistently during financial crises,
for example that credit and total factor productivity drop sharply with the on-
set of the crisis but that employment drops to a lesser extent. Our model
addresses these features, and our deliberately stark modeling choices enable a
relatively clean identification of the working capital channel of financial shocks.
2The question is as follows: “What percentage of your firm’s sales’ to customers in value
terms over the last 12 months were (a) paid before the delivery of your products or ser-
vices/(b) paid on delivery of your products or services/(c) sold on credit (payment due after
the time of delivery of your products or services)?”
3Blanchard and Kremer (1997)’s concept of disorganization can be understood in terms of
our framework as the case where a complex production economy makes a sudden transition
from one that is under central direction to a decentralized network of firms. The transition
takes place without the benefit of large interlocking balance sheets. The result is a breakdown
of incentives, undermining the complex production chain.
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Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Mendoza (2006) have emphasized working cap-
ital shortages in their models of fluctuations in emerging economics. although
their modeling relies on quantitative constraints on firms’ financing. Raddatz
(2006, 2010) presents cross-section evidence using firm level data that finan-
cial shocks affect firm level financing needs as revealed through components of
working capital.
This chapter contributes to an active debate on how macroeconomic activity
is affected by fluctuations in the interest rate faced by corporate borrowers.
Gilchrist, Yankov, and Zakraǰsek (2009) and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012)
document that credit spreads have substantial effect on macro activity measures.
The contribution of this chapter is to highlight the working capital channel of
financial frictions, and show how financing cost can impact output even in a
model without physical capital or labor/product market distortions.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces basics of the the-
oretical model. Section 2.3 details the construction of upstreamness measure.
Section 2.4 explains the details of the data used in this chapter. Section 2.5
shows how we test the implications of our model as well as the results. Sec-
tion 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Model
Our model builds on Kim and Shin (2012), which in turn is a multi-stage version
of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) model of moral hazard. The model is built
around a production chain as depicted in Figure 2.1. Firm 0 sells the final
output. The other firms produce intermediate inputs that are necessary in the
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Figure 2.1: Production Chain
 
production of the final good. Firm i + 1 supplies its output to firm i. In
addition to firm 0, there are N upstream firms.
There is a “time to build” element in the production. Each step of the
production process takes precisely one period of time, where time is indexed
by t ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · }. Firm i incurs a production cost of wi, which must draw
on the firm’s cash holdings, and cannot be deferred. We may interpret wi as
the wage costs of firm i, and so this feature corresponds to the assumption that
firms cannot borrow from workers.
Each firm has the choice of high effort or low effort. If all firms exert high
effort, then the output of the production chain can be sold at price qN > 0 with
certainty. However, if one or more firms exert low effort, there is a probability
ε > 0 that the product fails, and the production chain must be dismantled. Low
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Table 2.1: Cash flows before transfers
Firms




... · · · −wN−1 −wN
t N − 1 −w1 · · · −wN−1 −wN
N −w0 −w1 · · · −wN−1 −wN
N + 1 qN − w0 −w1 · · · −wN−1 −wN






effort by firm i can be interpreted as the decision to economize on the cost of
producing firm i’s intermediate good, and to divert the resulting cost saving to
alternative uses that result in private benefit, but is detrimental to the success
of the final output in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).
Conditional on the product not failing, the cash flows of the firms (before any
transfers take place) can be depicted as in Table 2.1. Once the final product
begins to generate a cash flow, the revenue cascades back up the production
chain instantaneously. Denote by pi the per-period payment to firm i from
firm i − 1 for the intermediate good. In turn, firm i pays pi+1 to its own
supplier, firm i + 1. All firms face the interest rate r, which reflects the cost
of credit to the firm. The firm discounts future payoffs at interest rate r. By
exerting low effort, firm i enjoys per-period private benefit of
bwi (2.1)
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where b > 0 is common to all firms. If firm i exerts low effort today, the
probability of product failure is ε when the final good goes on sale i+ 1 periods
ahead. When firm i has exerted high effort at every date in the past, the
expected payoff from exerting high effort at all subsequent dates is






The payoff to deviating to low effort today for one period is













So, the incentive compatibility constraint against a one period deviation to low
effort is
pi ≥ pi+1 + (1 + bi)wi (2.4)
where bi is the positive constant
bi =
b · r (1 + r)i
ε
(2.5)
As well as the one period deviation, the firm has other possible deviations but
it can be shown that the incentive compatibility constraint (2.4) is sufficient to
rule out all other possible deviations from high effort (see Kim and Shin (2012)).
The constraint (2.4) captures the recursive moral hazard inherent in our
model. The moral hazard is recursive in the sense that the payment to firm i
must be sufficiently large so as to induce it not to take the private benefit, but
the payment to firm i also includes the rent that is due to its supplier firm, i+1.
In turn, the payment pi+1 includes rents that accrue to suppliers further up the
chain.4 The payments {pi} that make the incentive compatibility constraints
4Saki Bigio has pointed out that the value function Vi for firm i in the planner’s problem can





1+r (Vi−1 + Vi) + bwi
}
− wi. Then Vi < Vi−1,
so that upstream firms have lower value and are more prone to moral hazard.
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(1 + bk)wk (2.6)
The prices {pi} incorporate rents {bkwk} for all the upstream firms k along
the production chain. Production of the final good is feasible only when
qN ≥
∑N
k=0 (1 + bk)wk. Equation (2.6) points to the possibility that long pro-
duction chains may break down, not only because of the technological/logistical
concerns5 but also because of the viability of production in the face of incentive
problems. However, interlocking balance sheets through accounts receivable can
improve the allocation, at the expense of requiring greater working capital for
the firms. Suppose that firm i maintains accounts receivable Ri from firm i−1,
and maintains accounts payable of Pi to firm i+1. The accounts receivable and
accounts payable are inter-firm credit, and they are amortized as perpetuities.
Thus, Ri is amortized with constant payment aipi. The per-period payment
from i− 1 to i gross of the underlying sale price is:
(1 + ai) pi (2.7)
In the presence of amortization payments, the incentive compatibility constraint
with working capital is given by:
(1 + ai) pi ≥ (1 + ai+1) pi+1 + (1 + bi)wi (2.8)
When the incentive compatibility constraints bind, the payments {pi} along
the chain satisfy:
5The fragility of long production chains has received much attention from development







(1 + bk)wk (2.9)
By holding a sufficiently large account receivable Ri, the amortization payment
can be made large, and so the fundamental price pi can be made as low as
desired. We search for a solution to the optimal contracting problem where the
underlying price pi satisfies the participation constraint; the discounted sum of




(1 + r)k−i+1wk (2.10)
The incentive compatibility constraint binds in the optimal contract, so that
from (2.8) and (2.10) we have
aipi − ai+1pi+1 = pi+1 − pi + (1 + bi)wi









Substituting (2.5) into (2.11) we have
aipi − ai+1pi+1 =
(







Equation (2.12) gives the net interest payment received by firm i. For ε
small enough, the net interest payment is positive, reflecting the fact that the
firm is a net lender along the chain, which is to say that its net receivables are
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Ri − Pi =
(







The first term inside the parenthesis of equation (2.13) is increasing in i and
the second term is decreasing in i, which implies that Ri−Pi is increasing in i.
We thus have the following result.
Proposition 1. The net receivables of firm i relative to wi is higher for upstream
firms.
In other words, the working capital of upstream firms is higher than the
working capital of downstream firms. The incentive compatibility constraints
bind harder for upstream firms compared to downstream firms. Note from
(2.13) that for ε small enough the net receivables of any firm is increasing
in the interest rate r, provided that the production chain remains viable in
the sense that qN ≥ p0 = 1(1+a0)
∑N
k=0 (1 + bk)wk. However, since {bk} are











wk ), the production chain is no longer
economically viable and breaks down. The most upstream firm N then falls out
of the chain and produces as a stand-alone firm. We thus have the following
proposition, which gives our main empirical hypothesis.
Proposition 2. The net working capital of firm i is non-monotonic in interest
rate r. For small increases, net working capital increases. However, if r > r∗
for some threshold r∗, firm i’s net working capital falls.
A clear empirical prediction is that firms that are higher up the chain are
more sensitive to the fluctuations in the interest rate. When credit conditions
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are permissive, so that r falls, then longer production chains become viable, so
that more firms enter the production chain as upstream firms. However, when
the interest rate rises during crises, the production chain shortens and upstream
firms exit from the chain.
2.3 Measuring Sector-Level Upstreamness
2.3.1 Conceptual Measures of Upstreamness
We construct an industry-level measure of firms’ typical location in the produc-
tion chain based on Antràs, Chor, Fally, and Hillberry (2012) and Fally (2011).6
We first outline the main features of these measures and then give further details
on how we calculate our measures. Fally (2011) proposes a measure which prox-
ies the distance from final-good production. The intuitive logic of this measure
is that industries selling a disproportionate share of their output to relatively
upstream industries should be relatively upstream themselves.
The measure is defined as:






where dijYj/Yi is the share of sector i’s total output that is purchased by industry
j. It is clear that Ui ≥ 1. The corresponding upstreamness values for each
industry are placed in the matrix U , which is equal to [I − ∆]−11 where ∆ is
the matrix with dijYj/Yi in entry (i,j) and 1 is column vector of ones.
6There are other studies that develop measures of upstreamness: Bigio and LaO (2013)
employs for U.S. firms an industry-level measure of upstreamness constructed using Input-
Output (I-O) tables compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Gofman (2013) constructs
a firm-level measure of upstreamness using a novel database that provides information on
supplier-customer relationships for 990 U.S. firms.
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2.3.1.1 Economic Interpretation of Measures of Upstreamness
Antràs, Chor, Fally, and Hillberry (2012) show that this measure (and the
equivalent measure suggested by Antràs and Chor (2013)) have the following
interpretations: a) Holding constant the final-use vector F and off diagonal









so Ui equals the semi-elasticity of an industry’s output to a uniform change in
input-output linkages within industries. Intuitively, when the extent to which
industries rely on inputs from their own sector increases, this will tend to in-
crease output in all industries, but one would expect the effect to be dispropor-
tionately larger in upstream industries via a multiplier effect. and b) Holding







where Vi refers to value added in industry i. Thus, Ui turns out to equal the
dollar amount by which output of all sectors increases following a one dollar
increase in value added in sector i.
2.3.2 Upstreamness in an Open Economy
In an open economy context, (13) is modified to the following expression:
Yi = Fi + Zi = Fi +
N∑
j=1
dijYj +Xi −Mi (2.17)
79
The share of a country’s gross output in industry i that is used as intermediate





where the following assumption i.e. δij = Xij/Xi = Mij/Mi is imposed. Because
in practice, information on international interindustry flows i.e. Xij and Mij is





It can be easily verified that two measures of upstreamness given in Equa-
tion 2.15 and Equation 2.16 stay equal after replacing dij with d̂ij.
2.3.3 How to Measure Upstreamness in OECD Coun-
tries?
We use the OECD STAN database, which provides input-output (I-O) tables
for many countries. Following Antràs, Chor, Fally, and Hillberry (2012), we
focus on the 16 OECD countries that, as of 2005, reported data using the same
industry classification, namely, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Spain, and the United States.7 The countries have common
industry classifications for 41 sub-industries, 18 of which are in manufactur-
ing.8 Thus, we focus on 18 sub-industries of manufacturing that share an exact
7Different from Antràs, Chor, Fally, and Hillberry (2012), Luxembourg is excluded from
our analysis. See the following data section for details about sample selection criteria.
8We have to exclude the sectors that are not reported in Eurostat from our analysis. We
assume that those sectors have been merged into other sectors by Eurostat. The excluded sec-
tors are: “pharmaceuticals,” “non-ferrous metals,” “railroad equipment and transport equip-
ment,” “aircraft and spacecraft,” “manufacture of gas,” “steam and hot water supply,” and
“household and social work.”
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aggregation of the data for 2005.
We use the detailed Supplementary Use Tables after redefinitions whose
(i, j)th entry reports the value of inputs of commodity i used in the production
of industry j in the given country’s economy. Taking the open-economy adjust-
ment in (21) into account, we construct the related square matrix ∆ for each
individual country in the OECD sample. The numerator of the (i, j)th entry
of ∆; i.e., dijYj is precisely the value of commodity i used in j’s production.
We therefore plug in the (i, j)th entry from the Use Table for this numerator.
The denominator Yi − Xi + Mi is in turn calculated as the sum of values in
row i of the Use Table, less that recorded under net exports and net changes in
inventories. With this ∆, the formula [I −∆]−11 then delivers a column vector
whose ith entry is the upstreamness value for industry i of the given country.
Using the above-mentioned methodology, we calculate the upstreamness val-
ues for each given country-industry pair in our OECD sample.9 We first check
the joint correlation of upstreamness values across all countries in our OECD
sample through a principal component analysis. We find that 79 percent of the
cross-country variation in upstreamness values is captured by a single compo-
nent suggesting that upstreamness values are jointly correlated to a high degree.
Table 2.3 displays the mean upstreamness values by sub-industries of manu-
facturing industry. Each individual mean upstreamness value is obtained by av-
eraging the corresponding upstreamness values of the given sub-industry over all
9We replicate Table 3 in Antràs, Chor, Fally, and Hillberry (2012) to verify the consistency
of industry upstreamness values across our countries. Similarly, we conduct a Spearman rank
correlation test among all countries in our OECD sample. For each individual country, the
rank correlation is large and positive, which is significantly different from zero with p-value
of 0.01. Those correlations can be requested from the authors.
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countries in our OECD sample.10 Those mean values reveal that sub-industries
of manufacturing industry vary considerably in terms of their average produc-
tion line position. The mean upstreamness value across those 18 sub-industries
ranges from a minimum of 1.84 (Food products, beverages and tobacco) to a
maximum of 3.97 (Iron and steel). That is, on average, “food products, bever-
ages and tobacco” is the the most downstream industry with most of its output
going directly to the end-user, while “iron and steel” is most upstream industry
operating to manufacture raw materials. Across those sub-industries, we find
a mean upstreamness of 2.53, and a standard deviation of 0.56. The average
sub-industry in manufacturing industry therefore enters into use in production
processes roughly more than two stages before final consumption or investment.
2.4 Measuring Firm-Level Accounts
Our analysis exploits cross-country firm-level data from ORBIS, focusing on
OECD countries. ORBIS is a commercial dataset provided by BvD, which
contains administrative data on millions of firms worldwide. The financial and
balance sheet information is initially collected by local Chambers of Commerce
and in turn, is relayed to BvD through some 40 different information providers.
For European countries the data goes back to 1996 but for most countries most
reliable data starts in 2000 (for U.S. in 2005). Further details about our data
and preliminary data cleaning are available in Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and
Yesiltas (2012) and Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Volosovych (2014).
The data set provides financial and ownership information for each firm. We
10The upstreamness values we calculate for each individual country-industry pair are avail-
able from the authors.
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use an unbalanced panel of firms and ascertain that the panel does not suffer
from survivorship bias by assembling our data from historical, archived releases
of the database.
2.4.1 Sample Selection Criteria
Focusing only on the manufacturing firms from our 16 OECD countries, we
have medium/large/very large firms from different sub-industries, which are
classified according to two-digit NACE Revision 1.1. Primary codes.11 We
apply the following sample selection criteria to obtain our final sample:
• We drop firms that have inconsistent information on any generic variables
such date of establishment/type of company/template etc.
• We drop firm-year observations with negative values of all types of as-
sets/liabilities.
• We drop firm-year observations with negative values on employment, sales
and operating revenue.
• We keep the firms with non-missing information on key variables such
as accounts payable, accounts receivable, working capital and operating
revenue between 2000–2009.
• We first trim both 1% tails of distribution of “accounts payable to oper-
ating revenue,” “accounts receivable to operating revenue,” “net accounts
receivable to operating revenue,” and “working capital to operating rev-
enue.”
11BvD defines medium, large and very large firms as firms with employees more than 15,
150, and 1000, respectively.
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• In the cross-section regressions where we use growth values of “working
capital over operating revenue” as dependent variables, we also drop the
firm-year observations of the respective dependent variables whose z-scores
are greater than 5 in absolute value.12
After this, we continue our analysis with countries having at least 1000
observations between 2000 and 2009 and we exclude Luxembourg. Of note,
U.S. firms have limited data for 2000–2003, thus we only use the period 2004–
2009 for the United States throughout the empirical analysis.
Table 2.4 displays the list of countries in our sample. We have over 150
thousand manufacturing firms (over 600 thousand firm-year observations). Ta-
ble 2.5 presents the number of observations by firm types: medium/large/very
large, listed/unlisted, and young/mature. Our sample is heterogeneous in terms
of firm type as most of our firms are medium unlisted mature manufacturing
firms.13
2.4.2 Definitions of Firm-level Variables
The key financial variables we use are accounts receivable, accounts payable,
stocks (inventories), working capital, operating revenue, total assets, short-term
12We construct the z-scores as |xit−msd | where x, m, and sd refer to the value, mean, and
standard deviation of the corresponding growth variable.
13ORBIS is not fully representative because smaller and younger firms are under-represented
and more so in some countries than in others. Various methods have been used in the literature
to address this issue. For example, Andrews and Cingano (2014) align the sample of firms
with the distribution of firm populations as reflected in the OECD Structural Demographic
Business Statistics (SDBS), which is based on confidential national business registers. They
use re-sampling weights, based on the number of employees in each SDBS industry-size class
cell, which essentially scales-up the number of observations in each cell so that they match
those observed in the SDBS. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Volosovych (2014) do another
adjustment using propensity score matching on the data used in this chapter and observe
no differences in the results between the full data set and the data set constructed to be
representative across countries.
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debt, bank debt, long-term debt, and total debt. We use Total Assets (TA) and
Operating Revenue (OR) to normalize the financial variables that we use in
our empirical analysis.14 Our theoretical model uses inter-firm credit figures
relative to production cost. We used such figures (accounts receivable, accounts
payable, working capital) relative to wage bill, total input cost and also oper-
ating revenue obtaining similar results. Since normalizing inter-firm claims by
operating revenue maximizes number of observations we opt for that.
Accounts Receivable (REC): Total book value of trade receivables (credit
extended to customers).
Accounts Payable (PAY): Total book value of trade debt to suppliers.
Net Accounts Receivable (N REC): It is calculated as “Accounts Receivable
minus Accounts Payable.”
Stocks : Total book value of total inventories (raw materials+ plus goods in
progress plus finished goods).
Working Capital (WC): Stocks plus Accounts Receivable minus Accounts
Payable. Other short term assets such as other current assets, prepaid expenses,
deferred Charges and other current liabilities such as other short term debt,
other creditors are not included.
Short-term Debt : Total book value of short-term financial debt to credit
institutions, and all debt to trade creditors.
Bank Debt : Total book value of short-term and long-term financial debt to
banks.
Total Debt : Total book value of short-term and long-term financial debt to
14We convert all financial data into “2005 PPP dollars” using yearly GDP deflators with
2005 base from the World Bank and 2005 end-of-year US dollar exchange rates.
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credit institutions.
Operating Revenue (OR): Total operating revenue (Net Sales plus Other
Operating Revenues plus Stock Variations). The figures do not include VAT,
excise taxes, or similar obligatory payments.
Total Assets (TA): Total book value of tangible and intangible fixed assets.
2.5 Empirical Analysis
2.5.1 Financing Choice of Firms: Inter-firm Financing
Patterns
Table 2.6 provides the descriptive statistics of pooled OECD sample. All finan-
cial variables are normalized by Total Assets (TA) to be comparable. We further
normalize accounts payable, accounts receivable, net accounts receivable, and
working capital also by Operating Revenue (OR) because this is how they are
used in the regression analysis and present those numbers in the last four rows
of Table 5. The mean values of the financial ratios suggest that inter-firm finan-
cial contracting are important financing choices of the manufacturing firms in
the OECD sample. On average, trade credit and provisions constitute a large
part of their balance sheet. Accounts payable and accounts receivable (23%
and 33% of total assets, respectively) are comparable to the level of short-term
debt and total debt (36% and 46% of total assets, respectively). In fact, for
the manufacturing firms in the OECD sample, on average the level of accounts
payable is higher than the size of external finance from banks as total bank debt
constitutes 22% of total assets.15
15The mean values are consistent with those presented in the pioneering study of Rajan
and Zingales (1995). In their paper, they study the balance sheets of non-financial firms in
the G7 countries, of which 3 are included in our analysis. They find that the level of accounts
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The above statistics suggest that trade credit usage and provision levels are
important. Can this pattern be explained by firms lacking access to external
finance? To answer this question, we check trade credit usage and provision
levels of potentially financially constrained/unconstrained firms in our sample.
We follow the financing constraints literature which suggests that mature, large,
and/or listed firms are the least likely to be constrained.16 Given this stylized
fact, we group the manufacturing firms in our OECD sample according to their
size, age, and legal status.
Tables 2.7–2.8 display the descriptive statistics of accounts receivable and
accounts payable for different firm types. As reported, medium, young and un-
listed manufacturing firms, which are more likely to be financially constrained,
provide trade credit to their customers (mean ratios of accounts receivable to
total assets are 0.34, 0.33, and 0.35, respectively) while they borrow from their
suppliers (mean ratios of accounts payable to total assets are 0.24, 0.23, 0.28,
respectively.) In the same manner, very large, mature and listed manufacturing
firms, which are more likely to be financially unconstrained use trade credit
(mean ratios of accounts payable to total assets are 0.14, 0.09, and 0.22, respec-
tively) whereas they lend to their customers (mean ratios of accounts receivable
to total assets are 0.21, 0.16, and 0.32, respectively).17 These patterns there-
fore imply simultaneous usage and provision of trade credit at a level which is
receivable and accounts payable in United States, Germany and Italy (17.8%, 26.9%, 29%;
15%, 11.5%, 14.7% of total assets, respectively) are comparable to the level of total liabilities
(66.1%, 72%, 67.4% of total assets, respectively)
16See Hubbard (1998), and Bond and Van Reenen (2007) for comprehensive surveys.
17We implement independent group t-tests within each group to compare the mean values
of the financial ratios across the respective two types. In each t-test, we have quite high
t-statistics, which in turn suggests that the difference in means is statistically significantly
different from zero at 1% level.
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not simply a reflection of lacking bank credit. We further check the correla-
tion between accounts receivable and accounts payable and find a correlation
between accounts payable (normalized by total assets) and accounts receivable
(normalized by total assets) of 53%, statistically significant at the 1% level.
This indicates that manufacturing firms in our OECD sample simultaneously
borrow from their suppliers and lend to their customers.18
2.5.2 Testing Proposition 1
The magnitude of the moral hazard problem varies with the vertical position of
the firm in the supply chain. Firms at a higher position in the supply chain are
less sensitive to the success of final product, because their cost of low effort is
going to be realized at a later stage while the private benefit is realized instan-
taneously. The optimal level of incentives therefore increases with the vertical
position of the firms in the supply chain as stated in Proposition 1. We test
this proposition by examining the relation between upstreamness and accounts
payable (PAY), accounts receivables (REC), net accounts receivable (N REC),
and working capital (WC)—all normalized by operating revenue (OR). The pre-
diction of Proposition 1 is that the latter two variables are positively correlated
with upstreamness. We estimate the following equation:
Fi,s,t,c = β0 + β1UPSs,c + µc + µt + εi,s,t,c , (2.20)
where Fi,s,t,c is one of four firm-level financial variables examined. UPSs,c refers
to upstreamness value that proxies the vertical position of firms in the supply
18Gofman (2013) conducts the same type of analysis using a subset of U.S. non-financial
firms and finds patterns of trade credit consistent with our model.
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chain. The measure is constructed for each individual industry-country pair, but
only available in 2005. A positive β1 implies that firms with higher upstream
values have higher values of the financial variables F , on the left-hand side. µc
and µt represent country and year dummies (fixed effects), respectively. The
parameter of interest is the OLS coefficient β1, in particular, a test of β1 = 0 for
the cases of net accounts receivable and working capital is a test of Proposition 1.
Table 2.9 displays OLS panel regression results for the estimation of Equa-
tion 2.20. We find that the relationship between upstreamness and accounts
payable is positive and highly significant and even larger and highly significant
for accounts receivable. Because the latter correlation is higher the correlation
between upstreamness and net accounts payable is also positive with very strong
statistical significance as indicated by the t-statistic of 31.65. As net accounts
receivable is a component of working capital, Proposition 1 implies that the
relationship between working capital and upstreamness should be positive and
the fourth column verifies this hypothesis, again with a t-statistic over 30.
2.5.3 Testing Proposition 2
The moral hazard problem as articulated in our model is that firms in the pro-
duction chain may choose to exert low effort to economize on their production
cost and use the resulting savings in alternative ways that bring them private
benefit. When discount rates are high, firms bear less of the direct consequences
of their actions, and so the incentive compatibility constraint implies a higher
“skin in the game” when interest rates are high. Provided that the production
chain remains viable, as interest rates increase, higher incentives are needed to
overcome moral hazard problem. However, when interest rates becomes high
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enough, the chain start breaking down and the most upstream firms fall out.
The relationship between needed incentives are there non-monotonic, as stated
in Proposition 2. We test this prediction by estimating the following equation:
Fi,s,t,c = β0 + β1(UPSs,c × spreadt) + β2(UPSs,c × spread2t )
+ µc + µs + µt + εi,t . (2.21)
The variables are as previously defined, except we add Spreadt which refers to
the Bank of America (BofA) Merrill Lynch US Corporate AA Option-Adjusted
Spread in a given year.19 Annual spread values used in our estimation are con-
structed by collapsing daily time series into annual time series. Spread2 is the
square of the spread. The interaction variables are constructed by the mul-
tiplication of (spread-spread), (UPS-UPS) and (spread2-spread2), (UPS-UPS);
respectively, where X is the mean of any generic variable X. µc, µs, and µt
represent country, sector and year dummies (fixed effects), respectively. The
level (direct) effects of spread and spread squared are absorbed by the time
dummies.
The parameters of interest are the OLS coefficients β1 and β2: a positive β1
implies that upstreamness displays a positive correlation with the spread while
a negative β2 implies that the relation is non-monotonic in the spread. Ta-
ble 2.10 displays the results: for both accounts receivable and accounts payable,
we find with high statistically significance that the impact of small interest
19The Option-Adjusted Spread (OAS) of the BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate AA Index
is a subset of the BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate Master Index that tracks the performance
of U.S. dollar denominated investment grade rated corporate debt publicly issued in the U.S.
domestic market. This subset includes all securities with a given investment grade rating AA.
The BofA Merrill Lynch OAS is the spread between a computed OAS index of all bonds in a
given rating category and a spot Treasury rate.
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rate spreads is relatively stronger for upstream firms—with accounts receivable
displaying a larger effect implying, as seen in the third column, that net re-
ceivables are stronger affected by the spread in upstream firms. Further, the
negative (significantly) estimated β2 coefficient implies that net accounts receiv-
able are non-monotonically related to interest rate spreads for upstream firms,
exactly as predicted by Proposition 2. If we test Proposition 2 using working
capital, rather than net accounts receivable, we confirm the proposition with
even higher significance.
In fact we plot the median firm’s working capital in US against the spread
in Panel A of Figure 2.2. In the same figure, Panel B and Panel C plot the 25th
and 75th percentile firm, respectively. There is a clear hump shaped relation
only for upstream firms.
2.5.4 Upstream Working Capital in Booms and Busts
At the onset of the Great Recession credit spreads increased dramatically and
credit tightened with substantial effects on output. If the length of production
chains increased during the boom and shortened during the contraction, accord-
ing to our model of incentives, we would observe that working capital increased
relatively more for upstream firms during the boom and declined relatively more
for upstream firms during the contractions. In order to test this, we split our
sample into two sub-periods, 2004–2006 and 2007–2009, which might be inter-
preted as “good times before the Great Recession” and “bad times in the Great
Recession,” respectively.
Using those sub-periods, we estimate the equations:
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avg growth WC/ORi,04−06 = β0 + β1UPSc,s + µc + εi,t (2.22)
avg growth WC/ORi,07−09 = β0 + β1UPSc,s + µc + εi,t (2.23)
where avg growth WC/ORi,07−09 and avg growth WC/ORi,04−06 refer to the
average growth rate of working capital normalized by operating revenue aver-
aged over the periods 2007–2009 and 2004–2006, respectively. For any firm in
our sample, the respective growth rates are constructed as the first difference
of logarithmic values of WC/OR in 2007 and 2009 and as the first difference of
logarithmic values of WC/OR in 2004 and 2006, respectively. UPSc,s refers to
upstreamness value that proxies the vertical position of firms in supply chain in
given country-sector pair. µc represents country dummies (fixed effects).
Table 2.11 displays OLS results. In Panel A, we find a positive and significant
β1, which implies that firms that are higher up in the production chain expand
working capital during the high growth period. In Panel B, we find a negative
and significant β1, which suggests that firms higher up in the production chain
contract working capital in the Great Recession. These results provides powerful
indirect evidence of the necessity of a stronger role for incentives as production
chains becomes longer or shorter following the business cycle.
Finally, we ask if the firms which increased working capital during the boom
years, typically contracted working capital during the Great Recession. To
examine this question, we estimate the regression
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avg growth WC/ORi,07−09 = β0 +β1avg growth WC/ORi,04−06 +µc +µs + εi,t ,
(2.24)
where avg growth WC/ORi,07−09 and avg growth WC/ORi,04−06 refer to the
average growth rate of working capital normalized by operating revenue aver-
aged over the periods 2007–2009 and 2004–2006, respectively. For any firm in
our sample, the respective growth rates are constructed as the first difference
of logarithmic values of WC/OR in 2007 and 2009 and as the first difference
of logarithmic values of WC/OR in 2004 and 2006, respectively. µc represents
country dummies and µc represents sector dummies (fixed effects).
The results, presented in Table 2.12 indicate that firms that expanded work-
ing capital in the boom, contracted working capital in the Great Recession. The
relation is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, but the coefficient of
−0.012 is not very large.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has argued that working capital is the “glue” in production chains.
When credit conditions are permissive in good times and interest rates are low,
longer production chains become viable and more firms enter the production
chain as upstream firms. However, when the interest rate rises dramatically
during crises, the production chain shortens and upstream firms exit from the
production chain. We have formulated a theoretical model and derive predic-
tions for the relations between upstreamness and working capital and show how
this relation is a function of interest rates.
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Using a large-scale data set from ORBIS, we verify that upstream firms hold
higher levels of working capital and (equivalently) net accounts receivable. We
further verify the sharp theoretical prediction that the higher level of working
capital in upstream firms is increasing in low interest rates but eventually de-
creasing as rates get high enough. We further demonstrate that upstream firms
increased working capital in the high growth period of 2004-2006 and decreased
working capital in the great recession. Finally, we show that the firms that
increased working capital the more in the boom decreased working capital more
in the recession.
There are many avenues for further research. One potential avenue is the
role of finance in economic development. In an economy where the SME sec-
tor is well capitalized and financially sound, our model predicts that there are
beneficial incentive effects of the SMEs supporting large balance sheets. Some
European countries (notably Italy) and Japan have large and influential SME
sectors while the United States is more vertically integrated. Korea may be an
even more glaring example of an economy with extensive vertical integration.
Of the forces that drive the push toward greater vertical integration, a shortage
of working capital, implying a lack of incentives for upstream firms, may be one.
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Germany (1196) 65 23 18
Greece (540) 83 14 44
Ireland (496) 7 45 19
Portugal (505) 81 17 38
Spain (605) 71 27 31
Panel B:
(a) (b) (c)
Germany (1196) 1 14 18
Greece (540) 1 33 10
Ireland (496) 0.4 14 35
Portugal (505) 1 32 13
Spain (605) 1 22 21
Notes: Table 2.2 provides statistics on the payment terms of the firms of European countries,
which are investigated by “Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys” of
World Bank in 2005. For each country, Panel A displays the percentage of the firms, which
responded to the question “What percentage of your firm’s sales’ to customers in value terms
over the last 12 months were (a) paid before the delivery of your products or services/(b)
paid on delivery of your products or services/(c) sold on credit (payment due after the time
of delivery of your products or services)?” as “0”. In the same manner, Panel B displays the
percentage of the firms, which responded to the same question as “100”. The number of firms



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4: Firms Across Countries, 2000-2009: Number of Observa-
tions/Firms by Country
Country Firm-Year Number of Firms
Austria 1247 665
Belgium 30343 5495













United States 40929 15723
Total 616354 156868
Notes: Table 2.4 displays the number of observations/firms from ORBIS with some financial
data from selected OECD countries. Countries: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Czech Republic
(CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary
(HU), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES),
the United States (US). Financial Data: All companies with a known value of 1) Operating
revenue; and 2) Total assets; and 3) Accounts Payable; and 4) Accounts Receivable; and 5)
Working Capital. 97
Table 2.5: Firms Across Countries, 2000-2009: Number of Observa-
tions/Firms by Type









Notes: Table 2.5 gives a breakdown of our sample into medium/large/very large;
listed/unlisted; young/mature firms and provides the number of firm-year observations and
the number of firms for each type. BvD defines medium, large, and very large firms as firms
with employees more than 15, 150, and 1000, respectively. Listed firms are the firms quoted
on a stock exchange. Mature firms are the firms that have been actively operating for at least
ten years. Few firms do not have information on their legal status and/or date of incorpora-
tion, this explains why the numbers in the related groups do not add up to total number of
firm-year observations and total number of firms.
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Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics: OECD Sample, 2000–2009
Variable Obs. Mean Median St. dev. Min. Max Kurtosis
Payable/TA 606558 0.23 0.2 0.16 0.01 0.67 3.15
Receivable/TA 615650 0.33 0.31 0.19 0.02 0.76 2.45
Net Receivable/TA 606018 0.1 0.09 0.16 -0.29 0.5 3.11
Working Capital/TA 605153 0.28 0.28 0.19 -0.1 0.7 2.45
Short-term Debt/TA 595210 0.36 0.33 0.23 0.02 0.85 2.16
Bank Debt/TA 569870 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.00 0.68 2.25
Total Debt/TA 569757 0.46 0.47 0.24 0.03 0.91 1.99
Payable/OR 606722 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.01 0.52 3.2
Receivable/OR 615814 0.26 0.24 0.16 0.02 0.67 2.78
Net Receivable/OR 606182 0.08 0.07 0.13 -0.19 0.42 3.15
Working Capital/OR 605317 0.23 0.21 0.18 -0.07 0.74 3.33
Notes: Table 2.6 displays descriptive statistics for a pooled sample of European OECD
countries and the United States, 2000–2009. The included European countries are Austria,
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. The financial variables are divided by
Total Assets (TA) or Operating Revenue (OR) to obtain the above ratios. All ratios are
winsorized at 2% and 98%. See Section 2.4.2 for details on the definitions of those financial
variables.
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Table 2.7: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Types: OECD Sample,
2000–2009
Firm Type Variable Obs. Mean Median St. dev. Min Max
Medium
Receivable/TA 436423 0.34 0.32 0.19 0.02 0.76
Payable/TA 430238 0.24 0.21 0.16 0.01 0.67
Receivable/OR 436587 0.27 0.26 0.16 0.02 0.67
Payable/OR 430402 0.19 0.18 0.12 0.01 0.52
Large
Receivable/TA 140093 0.31 0.29 0.18 0.02 0.76
Payable/TA 137753 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.01 0.67
Receivable/OR 140093 0.24 0.22 0.15 0.02 0.67
Payable/OR 137753 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.01 0.52
Very Large
Receivable/TA 39134 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.02 0.76
Payable/TA 38567 0.14 0.1 0.13 0.01 0.67
Receivable/OR 39134 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.67
Payable/OR 38567 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.52
Unlisted
Receivable/TA 451376 0.33 0.32 0.19 0.02 0.76
Payable/TA 443721 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.01 0.67
Receivable/OR 451376 0.26 0.24 0.16 0.02 0.67
Payable/OR 443721 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.52
Listed
Receivable/TA 13072 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.02 0.76
Payable/TA 12930 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.67
Receivable/OR 13072 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.02 0.67
Payable/OR 12930 0.1 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.52
To be Continued.
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Table 2.8: (Cont’d.) Descriptive Statistics by Firm Types: OECD
Sample, 2000–2009
Firm Type Variable Obs. Mean Median St. dev. Min Max
Young
Receivable/TA 72095 0.35 0.34 0.21 0.02 0.76
Payable/TA 71004 0.28 0.25 0.19 0.01 0.67
Receivable/OR 72127 0.26 0.23 0.17 0.02 0.67
Payable/OR 71036 0.2 0.18 0.14 0.01 0.52
Mature
Receivable/TA 530142 0.32 0.3 0.18 0.02 0.76
Payable/TA 522173 0.22 0.2 0.15 0.01 0.67
Receivable/OR 530274 0.26 0.24 0.16 0.02 0.67
Payable/OR 522305 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.01 0.52
Notes: Tables 2.7–2.8 display descriptive statistics for our OECD sample, 2000–2009, by
firm types. BvD defines medium, large, and very large firms as firms with employees more
than 15, 150, and 1000, respectively. Listed firms are the firms quoted on a stock exchange.
Mature firms are the firms that have been actively operating for at least ten years. The
financial variables are divided by OR (Operating Revenue) and Total Assets (TA) to obtain
the above ratios. All ratios are winsorized at 2% and 98% before splitting into groups. We
implement independent group t-test within each group to compare the mean values of the
financial ratios across the respective two types. In each t-test, we have quite high t-statistics,
which in turn suggest that the difference in means is statistically significantly different from
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.11: Cross-Section Regressions: OECD sample, 2004–2009





Country fixed effects yes
Adjusted R2 0.018
Obs. 47414








Notes: Table 2.11 reports the estimation results of Equations 2.22–2.23 in Panel A and B,
respectively. In Panel A, the dependent variable; i.e., average growth rate of WCOR (04–06)
refers to the growth rate of WCOR that is averaged in the period 2004–2006. The corresponding
growth rate of WCOR is constructed as the first difference of logarithmic values of
WC
OR in 2004
and 2006. In the same manner, in Panel B, the dependent variable i.e. average growth rate of
WC
OR (07–09) refers to the growth rate of
WC
OR that is averaged in the period 2007–2009. The
corresponding growth rate of WCOR is constructed as the first difference of logarithmic values of
WC
OR in 2007 and 2009.
WC
OR is calculated as “Working Capital over Operating Revenue.” UPS
is an industry measure of relative production-line position. In all regressions, nonpermanent
samples are used. Standard errors are robust and t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.12: Cross-Section Growth Regressions: OECD sample,
2004–2006
Dependent variable, average growth of WC
OR
(07–09)
average growth of WC
OR
(04–06) -0.013** -0.012** -0.012**
(-2.57) (-2.43) (-2.38)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes
Sector fixed effects no yes yes
Clustered std. errors by no no country
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.018 0.018
Obs. 47860 47860 47860
Notes: Table 2.12 reports the estimation results of Equation 2.24. The dependent variable
i.e. average growth rate of WCOR (07–09) refers to the growth rate of
WC
OR that is averaged in the
period 2007–2009. The corresponding growth rate of WCOR is constructed as the first difference
of logarithmic values of WCOR in 2007 and 2009. In the same manner, average growth rate of
WC
OR (04–06) refers to the growth rate of
WC
OR that is averaged in the period 2004–2006. The
corresponding growth rate of WCOR is constructed as the first difference of logarithmic values
of WCOR in 2004 and 2006.
WC
OR is calculated as “Working Capital over Operating Revenue.” In
all regressions, non-permanent samples are used. Standard errors are robust and t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. The standard errors are also clustered by country in the last
column. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Figure 2.2: Testing Proposition 2
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Chapter 3
Leverage Across Firms, Banks
and Countries
This chapter is a reprint from the article, “Leverage Across Firms,
Banks and Countries,” by Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Bent Sorensen,
and Sevcan Yeşiltaş in Journal of International Economics, 88(2),
284-298, with permission from Elsevier.
3.1 Introduction
The 2007–2009 global crisis started in the financial sector and quickly turned
into a global recession with a decline in output, employment, and trade unprece-
dented since the Great Depression. One lesson learned from previous emerging
market crises is that banks’ and firms’ financing conditions are key mechanisms
in turning financial crises into recessions: declining collateral values lead to
higher cost of external financing which forces banks and firms to lower lever-
age and contract real investment leading to lower output (Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997)). Procyclical leverage is therefore a potentially important amplifica-
tion mechanism in propagating financial shocks to real economy (Bernanke and
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Gertler (1995)). Many commentators have argued that the lending boom of the
early 2000s, which fueled the run-up to the sub-prime crises, caused firms and
banks to increase their leverage substantially. When the boom turned into a
bust and banks deleveraged through contraction of credit, the global economic
meltdown occurred.
A number of recent theoretical papers aim at understanding the endogenous
leverage process (Farhi and Tirole (2010); Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008); Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen (2009)) but, to this date, leverage before and after the
crisis has not been studied in the framework of an internationally comparative
setting including listed as well as non-listed firms (financial and non-financial).1
This is the task we undertake in this chapter by documenting leverage patterns
across firms, banks, and countries during the 2000s. We examine if leverage
patterns differ across firms and banks, across large and small banks, and across
countries with different institutional and regulatory structures. In particular, we
study which types of banks and firms were highly leveraged in which countries
in the run-up to the crisis.
We utilize the most comprehensive and comparable firm-level and bank-level
world-wide data set; namely, ORBIS from Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publish-
ing (BvD) for the years 2000–2009 which covers listed, private, large, and small
non-financial firms, financial firms, and banks. It is important to use micro data
because aggregate country-level data may mask micro level patterns. Adrian
and Shin (2008, 2009, 2010) and He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) in-
vestigate US commercial banks and investment banks mainly using aggregate
1The highly influential works of Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009, 2010) and Greenlaw, Hatzius,
Kashyap, and Shin (2008) focus solely on the US
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sectoral Flow of Funds data from the Federal Reserve. Sectoral data may be
driven by the largest banks and it is important to know how typical invest-
ment and commercial banks behave. From a regulatory standpoint, the policy
prescription will differ if aggregate leverage is driven by few large banks rather
than by a large number of small and mid-size banks.
We show that leverage is procyclical for large commercial banks and invest-
ment banks in the US and to a lesser extent in Europe. Large banks have a
comparative advantage in raising funds in short-term markets (overnight repur-
chase agreements and commercial paper) and they were able to increase leverage
pre-crisis and skirt capital requirements by using off-balance sheet investment
vehicles. Large banks may be somewhat more stable than investment banks
due to their ability to obtain funds from depositors; nonetheless, excessive risk
taking by huge “too-big-to-fail” banks, which are considered safe due to explicit
deposit insurance and implicit government insurance, raises serious regulatory
issues. Our main result is that excessive risk taking before the crisis was not
easily detectable in aggregate data because pre-crisis increases in leverage were
typical only for investment banks and very large banks in developed countries.
These institutions grew their balance sheets aggressively by increasing debt and
assets but the large risks taken became clear only after the crisis started. Banks
in emerging markets behaved differently possibly due to tighter bank regula-
tion. Using regression analysis, we show that banks in emerging markets had
a tendency to grow leverage ratios less aggressively before the crisis and were
able to better maintain their leverage ratios during the crisis.
Our results may have important policy implications especially with regards
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to regulatory reform. Indeed, we find that banks in countries with tighter regu-
lation deleveraged less when the crisis hit in 2008. This result is consistent with
the finding of Beltratti and Stulz (2011) that banks from countries with tighter
regulation performed better during the crisis as measured by stock prices.2
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the
theoretical and empirical literature on leverage while Section 3.3 presents our
data and discusses relevant issues. Section 3.4 presents the empirical patterns
and regression results and Section 3.5 presents robustness analysis. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Literature on Leverage
Since the celebrated paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958) there has been an
outpouring of theoretical work on firms’ capital structure but empirical work
is only slowly catching up. Theoretical models pinpoint important departures
from the Modigliani-Miller assumptions which make capital structure relevant
for the value of firms. However, the empirical relevance of many theories is not
established and the empirical evidence on capital structure outside the US is
scarce because most of the literature uses data from COMPUSTAT on large
listed US firms. The empirical literature is mostly cross-sectional and therefore
doesn’t address time-series dynamics in leverage patterns (see Frank and Goyal
(2009) for an example).
The corporate finance literature studying US non-financial listed firms finds
2They consider very large listed banks with assets over 50 billion dollars.
110
that the most important cross-firm determinants of leverage are size, profitabil-
ity, and tangibility (collateral). Rajan and Zingales (1995), using data for non-
financial listed firms for the year 1991, show that these factors are also important
for leverage in other G7 countries and that differences in accounting practices
across countries do not substantially affect firms’ leverage patterns although
European firms have higher average levels of leverage compared to US firms.
Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) study ten develop-
ing countries using a data set of large listed firms in a static setting and find
that size, profitability, and tangibility also are important for developing coun-
tries; however, there are significant country-level differences in mean levels of
leverage. Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) undertake a dynamic analysis
using data from COMPUSTAT and CRSP for listed US firms and conclude
that more than 90% of the variation in leverage is captured by firm-fixed effects
while the determinants identified by the previous cross-sectional literature only
account for 10% of the variation—leverage is remarkably stable over time for
listed non-financial firms.
In simple textbook theory, bank capital is determined by regulatory capital
requirements. In more sophisticated models, banks optimize their capital struc-
ture responding to prices and pressures from shareholders and debtors in the
same fashion as non-financial firms in a market economy as modeled by Flan-
nery (1994), Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Myers and Rajan (1998), Diamond
and Rajan (2000), and Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2011). The recent the-
oretical literature on endogenous leverage stresses financial frictions: financial
intermediaries face frictions in raising funds and when frictions worsen they sell
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assets and reduce liquidity provision.3 Leverage-constraint models, in which a
tightening of constraints will lead to deleveraging, focus on the amount of debt
financing of intermediaries; see, for example, Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008)
and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
A rise in asset prices will mechanically increase the value of equity (banks’
net worth) as a percentage of assets. Keeping everything else fixed, rising asset
prices will lead to a lower leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of assets to equity.
Conversely, in a downturn, asset prices would fall and the leverage ratio would
increase. Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009, 2010) show that leverage patterns are
countercyclical for the US non-financial sector but procyclical for investment
banks. This procyclicality amplifies the business cycle, potentially leading to
systemic risk, especially if asset prices do not properly reflect fundamental val-
ues (“bubbles”). Investment banks actively manage their balance sheet and
leverage, typically through collateralized borrowing and lending, although this
chapter does not explore how leverage is managed. For example, if the inter-
mediary targets a constant leverage it will react to changes in net worth by
adjusting debt. If balance sheets are not marked to market—as is typically the
case for commercial banks—leverage is measured as total book assets to book
equity. Banks can react to an increase in asset prices by increasing debt and
assets, in which case the relationship between balance sheet leverage growth
and the balance sheet size (asset growth) can be positive.
Flannery and Rangan (2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010) find large vari-
ation in banks’ capital ratios and investigate whether capital requirements are
a first-order determinant of banks’ capital structure. Flannery and Rangan
3These models go back to the influential work of Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
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(2008) show that banks increased capital holdings independently of regulatory
requirements in the 1990s and interpret this as a reflection of reduced gov-
ernment implicit guarantees. Gropp and Heider (2010) undertake an analysis
similar to that of Rajan and Zingales (1995) using BANKSCOPE data with
both cross-bank and temporal variation as does the present article. They focus
on the 100 largest listed European and US banks between 1991 and 2004 and
find that the importance of size, profitability, and tangibility disappears once
bank-fixed effects are accounted for. They also find that minimum capital re-
quirements do not play a role in explaining banks’ capital structure. Another
important finding from the study of Gropp and Heider (2010) is that, on the
margin, banks finance their balance sheet growth entirely from non-deposit lia-
bilities. He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) emphasize the shifts in holdings
of securitized assets within the financial sector and show that investment banks
decreased leverage by selling assets during the deleveraging process of 2008–
2009, commercial banks and the government increased leverage by acquiring
these assets.
The empirical results of Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009) and Greenlaw, Hatz-
ius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008) suggest that the largest banks manage their
capital structure based on internal value at risk and not based on regulatory
constraints, especially for financial intermediaries that strive to maintain a con-
stant (maximal) risk exposure, often measured as Value at Risk (VaR), while
maximizing earnings.4 Leverage is high during boom times because perceived
risk is low while leverage is low during contractions because risk is high with
4VaR is an estimate of a financial institution’s worst case loss and is usually defined with
respect to a confidence level of, say, 99%. VaR is defined such that the probability that losses
on the asset portfolio exceed the value VaR is less than 1%.
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increased volatility of asset prices.
Overall, it appears that determinants of non-financial firms’ and banks’ lever-
age are quite stable over time and across countries, though there exist significant
country differences in leverage levels.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Data
We use a unique data set composed of firm- and bank-level observations for
2000–2009 from the ORBIS database provided by BvD. This database is an
umbrella product that covers other well-known databases from the same com-
pany such as AMADEUS (only European firms), ZEPHYR (worldwide merg-
ers), BANKSCOPE (worldwide banks), and OSIRIS (worldwide listed firms).
The time coverage of each firm/bank is a subset of the sample period, leading
to an unbalanced panel.5
The database comes in two modules: “Financials,” which provides financial
information—both on- and off-balance-sheet and “Ownership/Corporate Tree,”
which provides information on foreign and domestic owners of each firm as well
as all subsidiaries. In our original data set, we have 60,000 publicly quoted
companies worldwide (OSIRIS), 30,000+ banks worldwide (BANKSCOPE), 29
million European companies from 46 countries (AMADEUS), 18+ million US
and Canadian companies, 5+ million South and Central American companies,
6+ million companies in the Far East and Central Asia (mainly in Japan, Korea,
China), and 790,000 African and Middle Eastern companies (ORBIS).
5We use ZEPHYR data to control for all firm mergers and acquisitions that happened
during our sample.
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We only use banks/financial firms and “large” non-financial firms in this
study because small non-financial firms played no role in the onset of the crisis.
In fact, we document that even large non-financial firms did not increase leverage
before the crisis. For banks and financial firms, we use a benchmark world
sample because we have representative universal coverage. However, for non-
financial firms, we do not have a representative sample and coverage varies
across countries so we focus on “large” firms (defined as firms with more than
150 employees) from Europe and the US which comprise the countries with best
quality data and coverage. In Europe and the US, all corporations (listed or
not) have to file with official registries. Our European coverage is good because
companies have to file both unconsolidated and consolidated statements while
the US coverage suffers from the fact that many firms only report consolidated
statements.6 For non-financial firms, we use unconsolidated accounts to avoid
double counting and to improve comparability across countries while we use
consolidated accounts for investment banks because they only report these.
Adding consolidated statements (holding companies) for commercial banks does
not alter our results.
We use two types of samples for both banks and firms: permanent and non-
permanent. The non-permanent sample is used in the regression analysis and in
the investigation of cross-sectional patterns. We made sure the non-permanent
sample does not suffer from survivorship bias by assembling our panel data
from individual cross-sections using historical, archived releases of the database.
This is important since BvD erases the data on banks in BANKSCOPE from
6In addition to this issue, BvD has a relatively thin coverage for the US before 2007 even
for consolidated accounts.
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all previous years if the bank does not exist in the current year. They apply a
similar practice to firms in AMADEUS and in ORBIS where they keep a firm
in the data set for 5 years after it disappears and then erase it from the data
for all years. Hence, the data has to be downloaded disk by disk for every year
and not from the latest disk for all the previous years.
The permanent sample is used for time series figures. We have to use a
permanent sample here otherwise we would not know if the patterns seen in
leverage are due to entry and exit of banks and firms. The trade-off is that
these permanent samples will suffer from survivorship bias. Permanent samples
are defined as firms and banks with non-missing asset data throughout the
period 2000–2009—Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) make similar choices.
In the context of leverage, our bank data from BANKSCOPE is used by
Gropp and Heider (2010). In the context of the bank competition literature, it
is used by Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009) and Claessens and Laeven
(2004). Our firm data is used by many authors in different contexts. Arellano,
Bai, and Kehoe (2010) study the relationship between leverage and financial
development for one year (2004) using AMADEUS data but do not analyze
dynamic properties of leverage. Coricelli, Driffield, Pal, and Roland (2009)
use AMADEUS data to study the relation between growth and leverage in 9
CEE countries during the pre-crisis period 1996–2005. ORBIS, from where
we get the US firms, is identical to the well-known Dun and Bradstreet data
set for the US. For example, Black and Strahan (2002) use this data to study
entrepreneurial activity in the US. The firm-level data is also used in two other
studies involving two of the authors of this article; namely, Kalemli-Ozcan,
Sorensen, and Volosovych (2014) who study the relationship between growth
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and volatility and Fons-Rosen, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, Villegas-Sanchez, and
Volosovych (2013) who study financial integration and productivity spillovers.
The bank-level and firm-level data sets are suitable for international compar-
isons because BvD harmonizes the data. Our dynamic analysis either compares
banks over time within a single country or banks over time within a group of
countries using bank and country-time fixed effects which control for perma-
nent differences between banks or countries and for global common factors. For
our purpose, it is important to undertake a dynamic analysis, rather than a
cross-sectional analysis which doesn’t allow for fixed effects, because country-
fixed effects will absorb all features that are common to all banks and firms in a
country such as differences in accounting practices, balance sheet representation,
and domestic regulatory adjustments. For example, using international financial
reporting standards results in higher total asset amounts reported than when
US generally accepted accounting principles are used because netting conditions
are stricter under international standards.
Regulatory requirements might apply differently across countries; for exam-
ple, in the US minimum capital requirements apply both to individual banks
and to consolidated banks, whereas in other countries this may be different. In-
vestment banks and their subsidiaries in the US are regulated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) while other countries have different regula-
tory systems. Again, any non-time varying bank-level changes will be absorbed
by our fixed effects.
Differences between countries can be due to assets and liabilities being valued
at book value (historical) versus market value (current). If different countries
follow different accounting practices but all banks and firms within each country
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behave similarly then these differences will be absorbed by country fixed effects.
If banks and firms in various countries behave differently in a fashion that
changes over time then we cannot account for this with fixed effects. Therefore,
we stick to book value overall as reported in balance sheets if we have a choice
between the two as in the case of listed firms and banks. For private firms and
banks, we have book value only.
We use country-level measures from the Bank Regulation Data Set of Barth,
Caprio, and Levine (2007). This data set comes in surveys from 2003 and 2010,
respectively. We use the 2003 values of the following variables: 1) “Supervision
Index,” which measures the efficiency of supervision and takes a value of 1 if
there are multiple independent supervisors for banks and zero otherwise and
2) “Monitoring Index,” which measures the efficiency of monitoring and takes
a value of 1 if the top ten banks in the country are all rated by international
rating agencies, if off-balance sheet items are disclosed to public, if banks must
disclose risk management procedures to the public, and if subordinated debt is
required as part of regulatory capital and zero otherwise. We expect banks in
countries where the values of these indices are high to take lower risks in terms
of asset quality because it is relatively harder to hide such risks on or off the
balance sheet.
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
The leverage ratio is measured as the ratio of assets to equity (shareholder
funds).7 We explored other measures such as the ratio of Tier 1 capital (sum
7Our measure is equivalent to the measure 1−equity/assets used by Gropp and Heider
(2010)
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of capital and reserves minus intangible assets) to adjusted assets, the ratio of
total liabilities to total assets, the ratio of total debt to total assets, and the
ratio of total debt to equity. The patterns in those data series were mainly
consistent with what we show in this paper and they are not reported in the
present version of the article.
The leverage ratio does not reflect off-balance sheet exposure. One of the
key characteristics of the sub-prime crisis is that in the pre-crisis period banks
funded a growing amount of long-term assets with short-term liabilities through
the use of off-balance sheet vehicles, exposing themselves to credit and liquid-
ity risk by providing credit facilities and guarantees to these vehicles. Many
have argued that this was the main amplification mechanism (see Brunnermeier
(2009) and Adrian and Shin (2009)). In addition, many banks held structured
credit instruments on their balance sheet, increasing the maturity mismatch of
their balance sheet and their funding liquidity risk. We investigate patterns in
the ratio of off-balance sheet items (guarantees and committed credit lines) to
assets because a loan guarantee involves a future contingent commitment even
if it does not show up on the balance sheet. Banks report these data together
with the balance sheet as a separate memo line called off-balance sheet items
where they report guarantees, committed credit lines, and other exposure to
securitization. Very few banks report the last item and investment banks do
not report any of these items.
Tables 3.1–3.2 show the number of bank-year and firm-year observations
by country. We have over 200,000 bank observations and over one and a half
million firm observations from 60+ countries. Table 3.3 presents the number of
observations by bank type and account type. Most of our banks are commercial
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banks and most of our banks report unconsolidated accounts. The majority of
banks are not listed. Most of the firms in our sample are non-financial, unlisted
firms reporting unconsolidated accounts.
Tables 3.4–3.5present descriptive statistics for the data as used in the regres-
sion analysis—this data set is winsorized at 2% and 98%. The leverage ratio is
as high as 46 with a mean of about 12 while the maximum amount of off-balance
sheet items is more than 11 times of assets, although the mean across banks
is only 0.7%. Tables 3.4–3.5 also show descriptive statistics by type of bank.
Investment banks have slightly higher leverage on average. “Sponsor”banks and




In Figure 3.1, we plot bank assets since 2000. Panel A shows sectoral data
from the Flow of Funds accounts compiled by the US Federal Reserve System.
As shown, assets of commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions
increased from about 6 trillion dollars in 2000 to over 12 trillion dollars in 2008
followed by a decline of several hundred billion since 2008. Investment banks
(“brokers and dealers” in the Flow of Funds, which includes all institutions
who are engaged in brokering and dealing of securities) saw tremendous growth
8“Sponsor banks” are large banks which have created off-balance sheet investment vehicles.
We obtained the names of the sponsor banks from Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013). There
are 70 conduit sponsor banks in their data set and we have located 62 of these in our data.
31 of these banks are European, 23 are American, 4 are Australian, 3 are Japanese, and 1
bank is Canadian. Only 3 out of 62 are investment banks. Non-sponsor banks statistics are
similar to the statistics of all banks.
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in assets from 2000 to 2008 followed by a steep reversal of over half a trillion
dollars.9 The travails of the US investment banks culminating in the default
of Lehman Brothers have been extensively documented in many places, see for
example Duffie (2010), Krishnamurthy (2010), and other papers in the Journal
of Economic Perspective’s symposium on the financial crisis in the Winter 2010
issue.
Panel B displays bank assets, aggregated from our bank-level data, for the
US. In this article, we use the label “aggregated” for data summed over the
banks in our sample. Total Assets of each bank is defined as total book value
of intangible, tangible, and other fixed assets. Compared to the Flow of Funds
data, our aggregated data overstates assets because banks’ claims on each other
are not netted out. Nonetheless, the patterns in our aggregated data are similar
to the patterns in the Flow of Funds data for both investment banks and non-
investment banks. Using our data, we are able to break down the patterns
for large banks, large banks excluding investment banks, and small banks. We
define a large bank as a bank that has more than a billion dollars worth of
assets at the beginning of our sample. Panel C shows aggregated assets of
the European banks in our data set: assets grew marginally from 2000 till 2004
followed by a sharp acceleration to more than 20 trillion dollars in 2008 followed
by an astounding drop of about 3 trillion dollars from 2008 to 2009.10
Looking at risk-weighted assets may be more informative about risk tak-
ing and we do so in Figure 3.2. A clear divergence in the trend between total
9There may be brokers and dealers in the Flow of Funds that are not “investment banks”
in the BvD data; however, there is a large overlap between the categories.
10The European sample includes all European countries. Results with EU banks only are
similar.
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assets and risk-weighted assets can be observed for all banks and as well as
for large banks (aggregated from micro data), with risk-weighted assets grow-
ing more slowly. Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA) are defined as the sum of three
components: operational risk, market risk, and a weighted sum of assets with
appropriate weights determined by the regulators. The weights can be chosen
in a simplified manner or in a more sophisticated manner which is typically
used by large banks. The weights assigned in the simplified system are 0 for
government and other public assets, 20% for liabilities of other banks and se-
curities firms, 35% for secured mortgages, 75% for personal lending, and 100%
for corporate and commercial lending. A more sophisticated system includes
more subcategories based on credit rankings.11 Risk-weighted assets give an in-
dication of the degree of measured risks regulators believe banks take; however,
the low rate of increase in risk-weighted assets compared to total assets imply
that the risk that became evident during the crisis was not captured by the
risk-weights applied to banks’ assets in the period leading up to the sub-prime
crisis. Figure 2 shows that the risks that became evident during the crisis were
not captured by the risk-weights applied to banks’ assets in the period leading
up to the sub-prime crisis as risk weighted assets displayed lower growth rates
before the crisis.12
Figure 3.3 displays bank equity, in a similar fashion to Figure 1, using the
sectoral Flow of Funds data for the US in Panel A, and using aggregated data
(aggregation of bank-level observations for the US banks) in Panel B. Equity of
US investment banks grew sharply from 2004 to 2006 followed by a sharp drop
11See Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) for more details.
12Plotting the assets of the median bank, rather than aggregated assets, results in a similar
picture.
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in 2008 (the exact timing being slightly different between the quarterly Flow
of Funds data and the annual aggregated data). For large banks (excluding
investment banks) there has been a steady increase in assets. For European
banks, aggregated equity (displayed in Panel C of Figure 3.3) increased rapidly
from about 600 billion dollars in 2004 to about 800 billion in 2007 followed by
a slight drop in 2008 and a recovery in 2009.
Figure 3.4 compares aggregate US leverage, calculated as assets over equity,
from the Flow of Funds to aggregated leverage compiled from our micro data,
in Panels A and B. The US patterns from the Flow of Funds in Panel A are
very similar to those of the aggregated data in Panel B which display aggregated
assets divided by aggregated equity. In 2004, the SEC deregulated the minimum
capital requirements for investment banks, freeing leverage ratios from direct
regulatory constraints. A run-up in leverage of investment banks (“brokers and
dealers” in the Flow of Funds) from 2004 to 2008 is evident in both panels
although the Flow of Funds data, being quarterly, exhibits sharper peaks and
valleys. The collapse in the leverage of investment banks after 2008 is clearly
evident in both panels. This is mechanically explained by the sharp decline in
assets combined with equity rebounding in 2009. Leverage ratios of commercial
banks were quite stable from 2000 until 2008 when a steep decline occurred.
This is mechanically explained by the small decline in assets and the steeper
increase in equity seen in the previous figures. Panel C shows similar patterns for
the European banks. Table B.2 shows aggregated, mean, and median leverage
for 2006–2009 for other countries.
Aggregate patterns may be driven by a few mega-banks, such as Bank of
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America, Citibank, and JP Morgan. Our micro data allows us to examine lever-
age of typical banks. We plot median leverage for banks over time in Figure 3.5.
Panel A is visually dominated by investment banks which have pro-cyclical
leverage ratios between 14 and 20. These medians are higher than those of
commercial banks but much lower than the aggregate leverage ratios of invest-
ment banks—clearly, high leverage of investment banks is concentrated within
the largest banks. Panel B shows that the median European bank decreased
leverage steadily from around 17.5 to 15 over our sample.
The sub-prime crisis first came to the surface on July 31, 2007 with the
default of two Bear Stearns hedge funds followed by BNP Paribas halting with-
drawals from three investment funds. A large number of banks had created
off-balance sheet conduits which mainly invested in asset-backed securities in
order to reduce capital requirements. However, most conduits were still fully
or partially guaranteed by their sponsoring banks which also provided commit-
ted lines of credit (see Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013) for more details
on this). We have measures of guarantees and committed credit lines and we
display the aggregated amounts relative to assets for all banks and separately
for large banks in Figure 3.6. Investment banks do not report these items. The
total amount of guarantees and credit lines at 85% were almost as large as to-
tal assets from 2000 till 2007 for large banks and lower at 70% for all banks.
From 2007 till 2009 there was a sharp drop with the aggregate amount falling
to less than 50% of assets when banks were getting out of these commitments in
the wake of the interbank lending freeze and the difference between larger and
smaller banks narrowed. Panel B shows similar patterns for Europe in terms
of timing, though less pronounced in terms of scale: guarantees and committed
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credit lines never exceeded 22% of assets in Europe. This is partly due the
differences in regulation: banks in Spain do not issue guarantees to off-balance
sheet entities because Spain had imposed similar capital requirements for assets
on- or off-balance sheets, leaving little incentives for Spanish banks to use such
entities.
Guarantees and credit lines are not the focus of this article but it appears
that banks carry a large amount of risk that is not visible from conventional
leverage ratios. Ex post, major US banks were subject to increasing risk from
guaranteeing enormous pools of assets of declining quality; however, the pattern
of Figure 6 does not indicate increased risk taking before 2007—only the collapse
after the start of the crises reveals the risk taken. It is clear that outside of
investment banks neither leverage nor guarantees and committed credit lines
relative to assets (or equity) signalled excessive risk taking over time in the
run-up to the crisis. It appears that the increasing risk exposure of commercial
banks in 2004–2007 were hidden in the deteriorating quality of the asset pool.
Figure 3.7 shows median levels of guarantees and committed credit lines to
assets for large banks and for all banks. The median is much smaller than the
aggregate ratio for large banks and much smaller again for all banks. This holds
for both the US and Europe implying that issuing of guarantees and committed
credit lines was concentrated among the largest banks which disproportionately
affect the mean.
3.4.2 Bank Leverage: Procyclical or Countercyclical?
An increase in asset values will mechanically increase the value of both the
numerator and denominator of the leverage ratio but the increase in equity
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will be proportionally larger and the leverage ratio will fall. Such a pattern
is observed for households as pointed out by Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009).
However, a firm or a bank may be able to use the increased equity as basis for
further lending which will increase assets (and liabilities) relative to equity with
the outcome that asset appreciation and leverage is no longer inversely related.
Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009) demonstrate that non-financial corporations’ asset
growth and leverage is virtually uncorrelated using aggregate data from the US
Flow of Funds accounts.
A non-financial firm may face decreasing marginal profitability of invest-
ments; however, banks will often be able to invest with non-decreasing marginal
returns in large liquid markets, such as the market for mortgage-backed securi-
ties, while borrowing at a constant low rate through repurchase arrangements,
commercial paper, or implicitly through cash management for hedge funds. If
banks have target leverage ratios, leverage will not increase with asset values but
if banks target a level of risk exposure, leverage may be procyclical as Adrian
and Shin (2008, 2009) find for US investment banks 1963–2006. They find an
acyclical pattern for commercial banks, although Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap,
and Shin (2008) found a procyclical pattern for 5 big commercial banks in the
US. We do not explore models of how banks determine their leverage in this
chapter but Figure B.4 shows that aggregate leverage tends to move inversely
with the US VIX-index of risk.13
Figure 3.8 examines potential procyclicality for US investment banks, and
13VIX is the symbol for the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index,
which measures the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options.
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large commercial banks in Panels A, and B, respectively. The figure comple-
ments Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009) and Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin
(2008), plotting average growth of leverage against average growth of assets for
the sample of all (investment, and large) banks in our data set. In these fig-
ures, all banks have equal weight and the interpretation is that the figures show
whether typical banks display the “Adrian-Shin pattern.”14 Because all banks
have equal weights, the patterns are not strongly affected by a few giant banks.
We include a 45 degree line along which points will cluster if banks maintain a
constant level of equity implying that assets and leverage move in lock step.
Panel A focusses on US investment banks and the “Adrian-Shin pattern”
is easily visible over the full sample period. Year 2008 is an outlier with large
declines in assets and leverage but it pretty much lies on the line that one
can easily fit using ordinary myopic eyeballs.15 For large US (non-investment)
banks in Panel B, a similar pattern is visible, maybe with an even steeper
slope although the observations for 2008 and 2009, which are above the other
points, probably should be interpreted with caution: many observers, see for
example, Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008), interpret the increase
in bank lending in 2008 as “forced lending” where borrowers were drawing on
pre-committed credit lines. Certainly, the steep decline in assets, committed
credit lines, and guarantees that started in 2008 and accelerated in 2009 is
consistent with banks needing time to unwind their obligations. For smaller
14This is different from saying that the median bank displays the pattern. In the time series
graphs, we plotted medians against time but it is not as meaningful to plot median leverage
growth against median asset growth because the medians will belong to different banks.
15Note that in the figures in Adrian and Shin’s articles 2008 is the peak year. This discrep-
ancy to our results occurs because they use first quarter of 2008 where the crisis was still in
its infancy. Our annual data is from end-of-year accounts.
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banks, we do not find procyclicality and we omit results smaller banks for space
considerations. For European banks, we observe a slight tendency for leverage to
be pro-cyclical for large banks, although with a much smaller slope than found
for large US banks. Smaller European banks display a surprisingly stable level
of asset growth and no hint of procyclical leverage. These results are available
upon request.
3.4.3 Non-Financial Firms
Mean values of leverage for large non-financial firms over time are plotted in
Figure B.1. Mean firm leverage for listed US firms is very stable at around
2.3-2.4 while the leverage ratio is slightly larger for non-listed firms but still
much lower than for banks. This pattern is consistent with firms hoarding cash
in 2009 (for example, Almeida and Campello (2007) discuss how constrained
firms may be more likely to conserve cash in a recession drawing on their bank
lines of credit). For Europe, we see slightly higher leverage ratios, which may
be due to differences in accounting rules, but the temporal patterns are similar
to those of the US with very little variation over time except that we find a
weak but steady decline in leverage for all (mainly non-listed) firms. The great
recession does not register at all for European non-financial firms. Non-financial
firms showed no inkling of procyclicality and very little systematic growth of
leverage. We do not show these results for space issues.
3.4.4 Regression Analysis
From the previous section, it appears that leverage at the bank and firm level
did not signal an impending recession. In this section, we examine if leverage
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patterns differed between countries with looser or stricter regulation.
We estimate the relation
Leverageit = µi + ΣtγtDt + ΣtβtDt ∗Xc(i) ,
where the left-hand side is firm-level leverage, µi indicates firm-level dummies
(“fixed effects”), Dt is a set of time dummies (with 2000 left out to avoid
collinearity), and Xc(i) is one of the regulatory variables that captures intensity
of bank regulation in country c in which bank i is located.16 The bank-level
dummies capture any constant bank-level (and therefore also country-level) vari-
ables and the non-interacted time dummies capture world wide impacts in each
year. The objects of interest are the βt coefficients which show whether countries
with particular regulatory environments experience different temporal patterns
in leverage.
The temporal patterns in Table 3.6 are revealing: the time-dummy interac-
tion terms are in general not significant for 2001 to 2008 (meaning these years
are similar to 2000) except for the Monitoring Index (for all banks) for which
leverage is lower during 2001–2008 than 2000 in countries where these variables
are higher (meaning stricter regulation). More interesting is the result that more
restrictive regulation is associated with a relatively higher leverage in 2009.17
We interpret this in the light of the time series patterns observed in the figures.
Banks with high leverage and relatively risky assets displayed strongly declin-
ing leverage after 2008 when assets were written down. As discussed previously,
16In a previous version, we controlled for size (log assets), profitability, and collateral be-
cause these were found by Gropp and Heider (2010) to be predictors of bank leverage but
because those variables may be endogenous, we include only the variables of interest in this
version, including bank fixed effects to account for unobserved bank heterogeneity.
17At the time of this writing, the data set is not complete for 2009 where our sample is
significantly smaller than in the other years, so the results are subject to this caveat.
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standard leverage measures did not flag that the assets on many banks’ balance
sheets were questionable—this only became apparent when assets lost signif-
icant value in 2008 and 2009. If a restrictive regulatory environment helped
banks stay on a straight and narrow path in terms of asset quality, this should
be visible only when the banks in lightly regulated countries were deleveraging
during the crisis. The positive coefficient associated with strict regulation im-
plies that countries with strict regulation deleveraged less which we interpret
to mean that banks in those countries on average held higher quality assets
and/or avoided risk exposure through guarantees to off-balance sheet entities.
The coefficient to, say, Supervision Index of 0.291 implies that a change from
less restrictive to more restrictive leads to a change in the leverage ratio of
about 0.3. If the initial leverage ratio was 0.9 the new leverage predicted ratio
is 1.2—a rather substantial increase in leverage. Or rather, substantially less
deleveraging because all results are relative. The implication is that the un-
derlying problems in asset quality and, therefore, the vulnerability of the real
economy may be significantly impacted by regulatory constraint.
3.5 Robustness and Other Issues
3.5.1 Other Determinants of Leverage: Banks and Firms
What about the role of cash holdings? Figures B.2–B.3 display median and
aggregate cash holdings of US banks and European banks, respectively. For the
US, cash holdings increased slower than aggregate assets before the crisis but
this would not have signalled an increase in risk taking. The US data displays
a highly pronounced spike in 2009 which reflects the breakdown of interbank
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lending during the crisis when the interbank lending market froze as banks’
feared that counter-parties might be in danger of failure. The banks, therefore,
held assets on their books leading to the spike in cash while the Federal Reserve
lent directly to banks needing short-term financing.18 For Europe, the picture
is one of steadily increasing cash holdings, roughly mirroring the increase in
assets.
We performed firm-level regressions for non-financial firms but there was no
visible increase or decrease in leverage of the non-financial firms before and/or
after the crisis. We have checked whether this can be explained by firms’ cash
holdings but cash holdings do not display significant time variation. These
results are available upon request.
3.5.2 The Role of Conduits
Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and Hirsch (2014) show that commercial banks set
up conduits to securitize assets—specifically Asset Backed Commercial Paper
(ABCP)—without transferring risk to outside investors. These conduits were
designed to avoid capital charges and commercial banks facing more stringent
capital requirements were more likely to set up conduits with guarantees imply-
ing that risk was not transferred outside of the banking system.
Conduits are independent shell companies sponsored by large financial insti-
tutions.Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and Hirsch (2014) use a hand-collected data
set on the universe of conduits from January 2001 to December 2008 and their
18In order to limit any potential inflationary impact of the large reserves the Federal Reserve,
for the first time in its history, began paying interest on reserves in October 2008. In effect, the
Federal Reserve acts as an intermediary between banks with excess funds and banks wishing
to lend. This mechanism is explained in detail in Keister and McAndrews (2009).
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sponsors. They show that almost all conduits have credit guarantees issued
by large financial institutions. We do not have these conduits in our data but
we have the sponsors. The data on guarantees and committed credit lines dis-
played previously include the credit guarantees to conduits because these are
explicit commitments of the sponsor banks. Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and
Hirsch (2014) report that investors in conduits only lost 1.7% of their invest-
ments in ABCP because guarantees were called and the assets were liquidated
and looses absorbed by the sponsoring banks. Our figures are consistent with
this fact. Thus, it is clear that much of the deleveraging process is closely linked
to these conduits and their sponsor banks.
Did banks with conduits have different leverage? Most conduit sponsor
banks are large commercial banks: only 3 out of 62 sponsors in our data are
investment banks. In order to investigate if sponsor banks had different leverage
on their balance sheets, we plotted all our figures dropping all conduit sponsor
banks from our permanent sample. This had very little effect on the figures
which therefore are not reported.
3.5.3 The Role of Mergers and Government
During the crisis, several large commercial banks acquired investment banks,
notably JP Morgan’s takeover of Bear Stearns in 2008 and Bank of America’s
takeover of Merrill Lynch in January 2009. We do not control for these mergers
which took place mid to end of 2008/beginning of 2009. It is most likely the
case that the mergers will not cause an immediate increase in the assets of the
commercial bank but over time, as the securities held by the acquired banks are
transferred, we should see a rise in the assets of the commercial bank. Thus, this
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is a potentially important issue if we want to trace changes in leverage and assets
through the end of 2010 since Bank of America’s and JP Morgan’s assets may
increase as a result of the acquisitions. The same issue may effect the acquired
banks but He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) do not observe any change
in Merrill Lynch’s asset holdings in the first quarter of 2009. Other investment
banks were not acquired but ceased to be investment banks and converted into
bank holding companies, in particular Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley but
even after being converted into holding company status, the commercial banking
operations represent a very small fraction of the business of these banks.
The government played a very active role in recapitalizing banks. He, Khang,
and Krishnamurthy (2010) suggest that the preferred stock owned by the gov-
ernment must be subtracted from equity in calculating “true leverage.” They
find, using data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, that such a
correction raises the leverage of the top 19 commercial banks in the US from
10.0 to 14.4 in the first quarter of 2009. They further argue that “true leverage”
may have been as high as 30 if assets were marked to market. While they were
able to roughly impute the fall in the value of banks’ asset during the peak of the
crises for the commercial banking sector as a whole and for some major banks,
it is not easy to do so systematically bank-by-bank over our sample and hence
we do not perform such an exercise. We also do not perform an adjustment on
the government owned stock because if the purpose of measuring leverage is to
gauge the riskiness of banks, surely government owned preferred equity helps
buffer risk. We report asset and equity holdings and leverage of big investment
and commercial banks from the US and Europe in Table 3.7. Our numbers
match He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) for investment banks but for
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commercial banks we find a smaller increase in 2008 because we do not adjust
for government owned equity. A final difference is that they focus on subsidiaries
and, most likely unconsolidated statements, since they drop holding companies.
(One has to use either consolidated or the non-consolidated statements in order
to avoid double counting.) In our empirical analysis, we use unconsolidated ac-
counts for non-investment (commercial) banks and for investment banks we use
consolidated accounts throughout because these banks only report consolidated
statements. For the purpose of Table 3.7, we use consolidated statements and
include holding companies for both commercial and investment banks in order
to make a meaningful comparison between the two groups.
3.6 Conclusion
Traditional leverage ratios and off-balance sheet exposure did not signal high
levels of risk taking by commercial banks the US and other countries before
the sub-prime financial crises. However, investment banks in the US and large
European banks with investment banking arms aggressively increased leverage,
especially after the SEC 2004 deregulation in the US.
Our results are not informative about whether banks knowingly took high
risk. Nonetheless, when the crisis broke in 2007–2008, the banks in countries
with large exposure to sub-prime assets suffered large declines in assets. There
was little relation between leverage and restrictiveness of regulation across coun-
tries before 2008 but the countries with stricter bank regulation were less af-
fected by the crises implying that regulation may well have benefits even if these
benefits are invisible until the economy faces a major stress event.
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Table 3.1: Firms and Banks Across Countries, 2000–2009: Number
of Observations by Country
Country Bank-Year Firm-Year






































Table 3.2: Firms and Banks Across Countries, 2000–2009: Number
of Observations by Country
Country Bank-Year Firm-Year
(Europe and US Only)
KENYA 671

































Notes: Banks are defined broadly to include financial firms such as credit card companies,
private equity firms, hedge funds, broker-dealers, specialized credit institutions, etc. Firms
are non-financial firms from Europe and the US with more than 150 employees.
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All 30056 14680 13964
Investment 975 402 138
Commercial 29081 14278 13826
Consolidated 6826 2612 3246
Unconsolidated 23201 10978 10606
Listed 3351 1164 1074










Notes: Consolidated and unconsolidated refer to the number of banks/firms with con-
solidated and unconsolidated statements, respectively. Listed indicates the number of
banks/firms that are listed on a stock exchange. Financial firms are firms with Primary
NACE Rev. 1.1 sector code J: Financial intermediation.
137
Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics; 2000–2009:
All/Investment/Large-Investment Banks
Panel A: All Banks
N Mean Min Max
Leverage Ratio 180460 12.4 1.3 46.3
Total Assets (billion USD) 180553 11.5 0 3663.3
Adjusted Assets (billion USD) 141669 9.3 -36.9 3318.9
Equity (billion USD) 180504 0.8 -92.9 3472.3
Off Balance Sheet 79573 0.0 0 5.2
(ratio of Total Assets)
Panel B: Investment Banks
N Mean Min Max
Leverage Ratio 4101 13.6 1.3 46.3
Total Assets (billion USD) 4103 26.6 0 1599.6
Adjusted Assets (billion USD) 1890 32.2 0 1258.2
Equity (billion USD) 4103 1.1 -9 106
Off Balance Sheet 34 0.1 0 1.9
(ratio of Total Assets)
Panel C: Large Non-Investment Banks
N Mean Min Max
Leverage Ratio 33664 17.4 1.3 46.3
Total Assets (billion USD) 33673 38.9 0 3663.3
Adjusted Assets (billion USD) 20837 35.4 0 2332.6
Equity (billion USD) 33667 2.8 -92.9 543.5
Off Balance Sheet 1601 0.0 0 1.7
(ratio of Total Assets)
Notes: See Table 3.5 for explanations.
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Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics; 2000–2009: Sponsor/Non-Sponsor
Banks
Panel D: Sponsor Banks
N Mean Min Max
Leverage Ratio 404 22.7 1.3 46.3
Total Assets (billion USD) 404 490.3 0.1 3335.8
Adjusted Assets (billion USD) 366 514.2 0.1 3318.9
Equity (billion USD) 404 22.8 -1.8 198
Off Balance Sheet 11 0.0 0 0.1
(ratio of Total Assets)
Panel E: Non-Sponsor Banks
N Mean Min Max
Leverage Ratio 180056 12.4 1.3 46.3
Total Assets (billion USD) 180149 10.4 0 3663.3
Adjusted Assets (billion USD) 141303 8 -36.9 3318.8
Equity (billion USD) 180100 0.7 -92.9 3472.3
Off Balance Sheet 79562 0.0 0 5.2
(ratio of Total Assets)
Notes: The data is winsorized at 2% and 98% before splitting into groups which explains why
some extreme values are identical. In Panel A, statistics are given for all banks while Panels B
and C display statistics for investment and large non-investment banks, respectively. Panel D
displays statistics of conduit sponsor banks. The names of the sponsor banks are taken from
Acharya, Schnabl, Acharya, and Richardson (2009). There are 70 conduit sponsor banks in
their data set, of which we have located 62 in our data set. 31 of these banks are European,
23 are US, 4 are Australian, 3 are Japanese and 1 bank is Canadian. In Panel E, non-sponsor
bank statistics are shown separately. Leverage ratio is defined as the ratio of total assets to
equity. Totals assets are composed of tangible and intangible assets. Adjusted assets exclude
goodwill and intangibles. Equity is measured as shareholder funds. Off-Balance sheet items
are the sum of guarantees and committed credit lines. A “large bank” has more than one
billion dollars worth of assets in 2000. All non-ratio items are in 2005 dollars.
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Table 3.6: Bank Leverage: 2000–2009, World Sample
Dependent Variable: Bank Leverage
(1) (2) (3)
Bank Sample All All Large
Regulatory/Institutional (R/I) Supervision Monitoring Monitoring
Framework Index Index Index
2001× R/I Framework 0.012** –0.005* -0.007
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
2002× R/I Framework 0.006 –0.011*** -0.006
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
2003× R/I Framework –0.010 –0.014*** 0.001
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
2004× R/I Framework –0.003 –0.011*** -0.002
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
2005× R/I Framework –0.013* –0.011** -0.009
(0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
2006× R/I Framework –0.048*** –0.021*** -0.017
(0.009) (0.005) (0.011)
2007× R/I Framework –0.054*** –0.024*** -0.016
(0.009) (0.005) (0.011)
2008× R/I Framework –0.011 –0.009 0.007
(0.01) (0.007) (0.012)
2009× R/I Framework 0.291*** 0.140*** 0.073***
(0.056) (0.051) (0.019)
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.008 0.008 0.015
N 172344 136360 22116
Notes: Leverage is the logarithm of total assets over equity. Standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the bank level. The main regressors are country-level variables that capture the
regulatory and institutional framework (the exact variable name is given in each column’s
heading), interacted with time dummies. Column (3) limits the sample to large banks with
more than a billion dollars in assets in 2000. All regression variables are winsorized at 2% and
98%. 2000 is the omitted year. Supervision index measures the efficiency of supervision and
takes a value of 1 if there are multiple independent supervisors for banks and zero otherwise.
Monitoring index measures the efficiency of monitoring and takes a value of 1 if top ten banks
in the country are all rated by international rating agencies, if off-balance sheet items are
disclosed to public, if banks must disclose risk management procedures to the public, and if
subordinated debt is required as part of regulatory capital. This index is zero otherwise. These
variables are from the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2007), Bank Regulation and Supervision
Data Set. See Table 1 for the set of countries in the world sample.
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Table 3.7: Leverage of Very Large Banks
(2007) (2008)
Assets Equity Leverage Assets Equity Leverage
Bank of America 1616 138.3 11.7 1648.9 160.6 10.3
Bear Stearns 372.4 11.1 33.5 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Citigroup 2060.5 112 18.4 1758.2 130.6 13.5
Goldman Sachs 1054.7 47.2 22.4 802.3 59.9 13.4
JP Morgan 1471.4 116.9 12.6 1972.8 152.4 12.9
Lehman Brothers 650.9 21.2 30.7 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Merrill Lynch 960.8 30.1 31.9 605.5 18.1 33.4
Morgan Stanley 984.7 29.5 33.4 597.6 46.1 13
Wells Fargo 542 45.1 12 1187.9 92.8 12.8
BNP Paribas 71.4 4.8 14.9 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Barclays 2073.8 54.1 38.3 3335.7 77 43.3
Deutsche Bank 2315.9 47.3 49 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Fortis Bank 331.3 27.3 12.1 N.A. N.A. N.A.
RBS 3211.1 154.5 20.8 3051.3 76.8 39.7
UBS 1.5 0.2 6.4 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Notes: Leverage is defined as the ratio of total assets to equity. Total assets are composed of
tangible and intangible assets. Equity is measured as shareholder funds. All non-ratio items
are in billion 2005 dollars.
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Figure 3.1: Financial Sector Assets
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All Banks Large Banks
Notes: Panel A displays financial sector assets from the Flow of Funds. The numbers
are in trillion 2005 dollars, deflated by the GDP deflator. Panels B and C display total
assets aggregated from our bank-level data for different group of banks for US and Europe,
respectively. The numbers are in trillion 2005 dollars, deflated by the consumer price index.
Total assets is defined as total book value of intangible, tangible, and other fixed assets. A
“large bank” has more than one billion dollars worth of assets in 2000.
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Figure 3.2: Risk Weighted versus Non-Risk Weighted Assets







































    
All Banks (TOAS) Large Banks (TOAS)
All Banks (RWA) Large Banks (RWA)
Notes: The data plotted is aggregated from bank-level data and is denominated in trillion
2005 dollars. Total assets (TOAS) is defined as total book value of intangible, tangible, and
other fixed assets. Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA) are weighted according to riskiness with
weights determined by regulators. Bank can choose weights according to a “simple rule,” for
which the weights are 0 for government and other public assets, 20% for liabilities of other
banks and securities firms, 35% for secured mortgages, 75% for personal lending, and 100%
for corporate and commercial lending. A “sophisticated rule,” used by larger banks, include
more subcategories based on credit rankings; see Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) for
more details. A “large bank” has more than one billion dollars worth of assets in 2000.
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Figure 3.3: Financial Sector Equity
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Notes: Panel A displays financial sector equity from Flow of Funds data. The numbers are
deflated by the GDP deflator and displayed in trillion 2005 dollars. Panels B and C display
banks’ equity aggregated from our bank-level data for different group of banks in the US and
Europe, respectively. The numbers are deflated by the consumer price index and is reported
in trillion dollars. Equity is measured as shareholder funds. A “large bank” has more than
one billion dollars worth of assets in 2000.
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Figure 3.4: Financial Sector Leverage Ratio
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Notes: Panel A displays financial sector leverage ratio in the US, calculated as assets over
equity, using sectoral data from the Flow of Funds. Panels B and C display leverage ratios,
calculated from bank-level data for the US and Europe, respectively. We aggregate bank-
level assets and equity for different group of banks and take the ratio of aggregated assets to
aggregated equity. A “large bank” has more than one billion dollars worth of assets in 2000.
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Figure 3.5: Financial Sector Leverage Ratio: Typical Bank
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Notes: Panels A and B display median leverage; that is, the leverage ratio for the typical
bank in the US and Europe, respectively. A “large bank” has more than one billion dollars
worth of assets in 2000.
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Figure 3.6: Financial Sector Off-Balance Sheet Items
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Notes: Off-balance sheet items (book value) come from three summary lines in the balance-
sheet: acceptances, documentary credits, and guarantees. The number of banks reporting
acceptances is very limited. We use committed credit lines and guarantees for off-balance
sheet items. Panels A and B display aggregated off-balance sheet items, as a ratio of total
assets, for all banks as well as large banks for the US and Europe, respectively. A “large
bank” has more than one billion dollars worth of assets in 2000.
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Figure 3.7: Financial Sector Off-Balance Sheet Items: Typical
Bank
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Notes: Off-balance sheet items come from three summary lines in the balance-sheet in book
value: Acceptances, documentary credits, and guarantees. The number of banks reporting
acceptances is very limited. We use committed credit lines and guarantees for off-balance
sheet items. Panels A and B display median off-balance sheet items as a ratio of total assets
for all banks as well as large banks in the US and Europe, respectively. A “large bank” has
more than one billion dollars worth of assets in 2000.
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Figure 3.8: Financial Sector Procyclical Leverage Ratio: US










































−.15 −.05 .05 .15 .25
Mean Growth of Bank Assets








































0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3
 Mean Growth of Bank Assets
Notes: Panels A and B plot the growth rate of bank leverage, defined as growth rate of
assets over equity, against the growth rate of assets for US investment banks and large US
banks excluding investment banks, respectively. A 45 degree line is plotted for easy reference.
The growth rates are the mean growth rates across banks for each year. See notes to previous
figures (and/or appendix) for exact definitions of the variables.
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Shocks and Economic Fluctuations: Evidence from Corporate Bond and
Stock Markets,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(4), 471–493.
Gilchrist, S., and E. Zakrajsek (2012): “Bank Lending and Credit Supply
Shocks,” The Global Macro Economy and Finance, pp. 154–176.
Gofman, M. (2013): “Profitability, Trade Credit and Institutional Structure
of Production,” Available at SSRN 2365995.
Greenlaw, D., J. Hatzius, A. K. Kashyap, and H. S. Shin (2008): Lever-
aged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Market Meltdown. [D. Greenlaw...[et
al.]].
Gropp, R., and F. Heider (2010): “The Determinants of Bank Capital
Structure,” Review of Finance, p. rfp030.
He, Z., I. G. Khang, and A. Krishnamurthy (2010): “Balance Sheet
Adjustments During the 2008 Crisis,” IMF Economic Review, 58(1), 118–
156.
Hilbers, P., I. Otker-Robe, C. Pazarbasioglu, and G. Johnsen
(2005): “Assessing and Managing Rapid Credit Growth and the Role of Su-
pervisory and Prudential Policies,” IMF Working Paper.
Hirschman, A. O. A. O. (1958): “The Strategy of Economic Development,”
Discussion paper.
154
Holmstrom, B., and J. Tirole (1997): “Financial Intermediation, Loanable
Funds, and the Real Sector,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 663–
691.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Data Cleaning Process
The dataset I use in this paper combines firm-level information across differ-
ent BvD products (ORBIS disk 2005, ORBIS disk 2009, ORBIS disk 2013,
AMADEUS online 2010 from WRDS, and AMADEUS disk 2014). I clean the
data in four steps. First, I clean the raw data off basic reporting mistakes.
Second, I restrict this data to the one I use in my analysis and verify the in-
ternal consistency of balance sheet information. Third, I apply further quality
checks (paper specific cleaning steps) and construct two different samples: Full
Sample and Permanent Sample. Lastly, in each of these samples, we winsorize
the variables used in the analysis.
A.1.1 Steps to Clean Basic Reporting Mistakes
I implement the following steps to clean the raw data off basic reporting mis-
takes.
1. I drop firms if any detail of assets/liabilities/capital, and sales, operating
revenue, wage bill and depreciation is negative in any year.
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2. I drop firms if they report sales, operating revenue, total assets, the sum
of shareholderfunds and liabilities, and shareholder’s capital as zero in any
year.
3. I drop firms if employment is either zero or if employment is negative or
greater than 2 millions in any year.
4. I drop firms if any of total assets, total liabilities and shareholder funds is
missing in all years they report data to BvD.
A.1.2 Steps to Construct the Main Sample
1. For a given firm ORBIS–AMADEUS provides financial statements regard-
ing different consolidation codes i.e. C1, C2, U1 and U2.1 Given this fact,
I dropped C2 accounts to avoid double accounting in our analysis.2
2. I first drop firms with missing information regarding their industry of
activity. Second, I drop financial, real-estate firms. I also drop firms
operating in the sectors outside SNA production boundary (NACE Rev. 2
sectors T & U).
3. I drop state-owned firms.
4. I drop firms with missing information on the variables used in benchmark
analysis.
1C1: account of a company- headquarter of a group, aggregating all companies belonging
to the group (affiliates, subsidiaries, etc.), where the company headquarter has no unconsoli-
dated account, C2: account of a company-headquarter of a group, aggregating all companies
belonging to the group (affiliates, subsidiaries, etc.) where the company headquarter also
presents an unconsolidated account, U1: account of a company with no consolidated account,
and U2: account of a company with a consolidated account.
2The number of firms with C1 accounts in the final sample is very limited.
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5. I drop years with observations less than 1000 in a given country.
A.1.3 Internal Consistency of Balance Sheet Information
I check the internal consistency of the balance sheet data by comparing the
sum of variables belonging to some aggregate to their respective aggregate. I
construct the following ratios:
1. The sum of tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, and other fixed
assets as a ratio of total fixed assets.
2. The sum of stocks, debtors, and other current assets as a ratio of total
current assets.
3. The sum of fixed assets and current assets as a ratio of total assets.
4. The sum of capital and other shareholder funds as a ratio of total share-
holder funds
5. The sum of long term debt and other non-current liabilities as a ratio of
total non-current liabilities.
6. The sum of loans, creditors, and other current liabilities as a ratio of total
current liabilities.
7. The sum of non-current liabilities, current liabilities, and shareholder
funds as a ratio of the variable that reports the sum of shareholder funds
and total liabilities.
After I construct these ratios, I estimate their distribution for each country
separately, and exclude the outliers by dropping observations that are below
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the 0.1 percentile or above the 99.9 percentile of the distribution of ratios. In
addition to these filters, I apply further checks:
1. In the balance sheet, the sum of the book value of shareholder funds and
liabilities (SHFUNDLIAB) and that of total assets (TOTASSTS) should be
equal to each other. In the same manner, the book value of shareholder
funds (SHFUNDS) should be either equal or less than that of total assets. I
drop firm-year observations if they don’t satify this accounting rule.
2. In the income statement (profit & loss accounts), the monetary value of
profitability measures such as netincome (NETINCOME), cash flow (CFLOW),
EBIT (EBIT) and EBITDA (EBITDA) should be less than that of either
operating revenue (OPRE) or sale (SALE). I drop firm-year observations if
they don’t satify this accounting rule.
A.1.4 Further Quality Checks
After I apply the basic cleaning steps listed above, I check the quality of the
variables used in the analysis:
1. Age: I construct the variable “age” of the firm as the difference between
the year of the balance sheet information and the year of incorporation of
the firm (DATEINC) plus one. I drop firms that report dates of incorpora-
tion that imply non-positive age values.
2. Total Liabilities: As opposed to listed firms, private firms do not report
a separate variable “Liabilities.” For these firms, there are three ways to
construct liabilities:
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(a) Taking the difference between the sum of shareholder funds and lia-
bilities (SHFUNDLIAB) and shareholder funds or equity (SHFUNDS)
(b) Taking the difference between total assets (TOTASSTS) and share-
holder funds or equity (SHFUNDS)
(c) Taking the sum of current liabilities (CURRENTLIAB) and non-current
liabilities (NONCURRLIAB).
I follow first two options to construct “Liabilities.” Either gives the same values.
I could also have computed liabilities following the third option. However, I find
that there are more missing observations if I follow this approach. Neverthe-
less, for those observations with non-missing information, I compare the values
constructed following first two options with those constructed following the last
option. I drop firm-year observations where the values are different from each
other by 1,500 PPP dollars.
A.1.5 Winsorization
I winsorize at the 2 and the 98 percentile variables such as logarithm of real
sales, logarithm of total assets, collateral, profitability measures, inventory, cash
and all debt measures used in the empirical analysis.
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A.2 Composition of Debt Measures
1. Current Liabilities (STDebt):
• Loans (STFinDebt): All short-term financial debts to credit in-
stitutions plus part of long term financial debt payable within the
year
• Trade creditors (TC): All debts to suppliers and contractors (ac-
counts payable)
• Other Liabilities (STOL): Other Short-term debt plus other credi-
tors plus income tax payable, social expenditure payable, dividends
payable and other current liabilities
2. Non-current Liabilities (LTDebt):
• Total Long Term Interest Bearing Debt (LTFinDebt):
– Loans: All long-term financial debts to credit institutions
– Debentures and Convertible Debt
– Lease Liabilities
– Other Long-term Interest Bearing Debt
• Other Non-current Liabilities (LTOL)
– Other Long-term Non-Interest Bearing Debt











Table A.1: Percentage of Firms in Permanent Sample-By Firm Type
and Country
Country Pooled HU NL NO SE TR
Period 1999-2013 2004-2012 2000-2012 2004-2013 1999-2012 2005-2012
Panel A: Total Assets
All 40,016 5,532 191 716 32,895 682
Small 74.8 73.2 2.1 77.4 76.6 18.3
(29,929) (4,050) (4) (554) (25,196) (125)
Medium 19.9 21.1 16.2 17.7 19.3 44.4
(7,983) (1,168) (31) (127) (6,354) (303)
Large 5.3 5.7 81.7 4.9 4.1 37.2
(2,104) (314) (156) (35) (1,345) (254)
Panel B: Employment
All 38,276 4,547 181 579 32,808 161
Micro 66.4 50.8 6.6 62.7 69.3 9.9
(25,429) (2,309) (12) (363) (22,729) (16)
SMEs 31.3 44.7 44.2 35.2 29.1 57.1
(11,967) (2,034) (80) (204) (9,557) (92)
Large 2.3 4.5 49.2 2.1 1.6 32.9
(880) (204) (89) (12) (522) (53)
To be Continued.
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Table A.2: Percentage of Firms in Permanent Sample-By Firm Type
and Country
Country Pooled HU NL NO SE TR
Period 1999-2013 2004-2012 2000-2012 2004-2013 1999-2012 2005-2012
Panel C: Age
All 39,961 5,506 716 191 32,866 682
Infant 8.5 14.7 1.3 80.1 7.4 3.5
(3,414) (811) (9) (153) (2,417) (24)
Adolescent 11.9 14.6 1.1 49.7 11.6 6.0
(4,759) (803) (8) (95) (3,812) (41)
Middle-aged 65.2 70.7 11.6 245.0 64.5 60.0
(26,036) (3,890) (83) (468) (21,186) (409)
Old 14.4 0.0 12.7 0.0 16.6 30.5
(5,752) (2) (91) (0) (5,451) (208)
Notes: Tables A.1–A.2 show the percentages of firms by firm type and country. The firms in
each sample refer to ones with non-missing value of the variable on which the percentages are
based. In both tables, each cell corresponds to the share of indicated category’s number of
firms in total economy of the given country-period (%). In Table A.1, shares are constructed
based on firm size, and firm size is measured by the logarithm of real total assets and the
number of employees, respectively. In Table A.2, firms are categorized based on firm age. In
Table A.1, firm size categories are constructed based on predetermined dummies that each
equals one if the firm satisfies the criterion for the corresponding firm category at any time
during the three years prior to the introduction of LTV ratio cap: Small equals one if the
given firm’s size is below 75th percentile of the distribution, Medium equals one if the given
firm’s size is between 75th–95th percentiles of the distribution, and Large equals one if the
given firm’s size is above 95th percentile of the distribution. Micro equals one if the given
firm has employees less than 10, SMEs equals one if the given firm has employees between 10
and 249, and Large equals one if the given firm has employees higher than 250. In Table A.2,
Infant equals one if the given firm’s age is between 0–2, Adolescent equals one if the given
firm’s age is between 3–4, Middle-aged equals one if the given firm’s age is between 5–24,
and Old equals one if the given firm’s age is 25 or above. Numbers in parentheses refer to
the total number of firms with non-missing value of the variable on which the percentages are
based..
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics: Permanent Sample
Period: 1999–2012
Countries: HU, NL, NO, SE, TR
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 25th Pct. 75th Pct.
TotDebt 0.57 0.58 0.25 0.38 0.76
FinDebt 0.14 0.0022 0.2 0 0.24
FinDebtTOL 0.46 0.45 0.24 0.28 0.63
STFinDebt 0.023 0 0.054 0 0.0093
STFinDebtSTOL 0.3 0.26 0.19 0.15 0.4
TC 0.11 0.068 0.12 0.017 0.16
Collateral 0.26 0.16 0.26 0.041 0.44
Sales Growth 0.038 0.023 0.35 -0.082 0.15
Profitability 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.063 0.23
Size 13 13 1.7 12 14
Cash 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.032 0.33
Inventory 0.15 0.05 0.2 0 0.24
Age 2.7 2.7 0.68 2.2 3.1
Notes: Table A.3 reports descriptive statistics of main variables used in the empirical anal-
ysis for Full Sample. Debt measures are defined as follows. TotDebt: The sum of short-term
and long-term debt; FinDebtTOL: Total debt excluding trade credit; FinDebt: Total debt
excluding trade credit and other liabilities; STFinDebt: Short-term debt from financial in-
stitution; STFinDebtSTOL: Short-term Debt excluding trade credit, and TC: Trade Credit.
Debt measures are all divided by total assets. Further details on the composition of debt mea-
sures are given in the appendix. Collateral is the ratio of total tangible fixed assets to total
assets. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Sales Growth is the logarithmic
change of real sales. Size is the logarithm of real total assets. Age is the logarithm of (1+firm
age) where firm age in period t that is defined as t minus the date of incorporation plus one.
Cash is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to book value of total assets. Inventory is the
ratio of total inventories (raw materials+in progress+finished goods) to total assets.
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Table A.4: Composition of Liabilities-By Firm Type
Sample: Permanent, 1999–2012
Countries: HU, NL, NO, SE, TR
All Small Medium Large
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
(% of Total Liabilities)
STFinDebt 0.034 0 0.027 0 0.052 0 0.056 0
TC 0.11 0.067 0.096 0.052 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.088
STOL 0.52 0.51 0.56 0.56 0.44 0.39 0.44 0.4
LTFinDebt 0.17 0 0.17 0 0.18 0.032 0.13 0
LTOL 0.077 0 0.072 0 0.072 0 0.16 0.061
Notes: Table A.4 reports descriptive statistics of debt measures by different firm size groups.
Debt measures are defined as follows. STFinDebt: Short-term debt from financial institutions;
TC: Trade Credit, STOL: Other Short-term Liabilities, LTFinDebt: Long Term Interest
Bearing Debt, LTOL: Other Long-term Liabilities, and TC: Trade Credit. Further details on
the composition of debt measures are given in the appendix
Table A.5: Cash and Collateral Holdings-By Firm Type
Sample: Permanent, 1999–2012
Countries: HU, NL, NO, SE, TR
All Small Medium Large
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
(% of Total Assets)
Collateral 0.26 0.16 0.26 0.15 0.27 0.18 0.27 0.2
Inventory 0.15 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.14
Cash 0.21 0.14 0.24 0.18 0.13 0.07 0.078 0.028
Notes: Table A.5 reports descriptive statistics of cash and collateral holdings by different
firm size groups. Collateral is the ratio of total tangible fixed assets to total assets. Cash is
the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to book value of total assets. Inventory is the ratio of
total inventories (raw materials+in progress+finished goods) to total assets. Debt measures





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 Data Appendix
We use permanent and non-permanent samples both for banks and firms. The
non-permanent samples are used in regression analysis and in the investigation
of cross-sectional patterns. The permanent samples are used for time-series
plots.
B.1.1 Bank Selection Criteria
The data is from BANKSCOPE for the period 1990–2010. We exclude the first
6 years and the last year because of poor coverage. We apply the following
sample selection criteria to obtain the samples used in the regression analysis:
• We drop central banks.
• We drop banks with faulty records such as inconsistent information on
any generic variables: date of establishment/type of company/template
etc.
• We drop bank-year observations with negative values of assets/capital/reserves
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or deposits.
In addition to the criteria mentioned, we drop banks that do not report total
assets continuously for 2000–2009. The sample of European banks has 1123
banks with 11,230 observations while the sample of US banks has 7334 banks
with 73,340 observations—both for the period 2000–2009.
For other countries, in addition to above selection criteria:
• We drop countries with less than 20 banks in non-permanent sample.
The final sample has 9437 banks with 85,383 observations for the period 2000–
2008.
B.1.2 Firm Selection Criteria
The time period covered in firm-level data downloaded from the ORBIS and
AMADEUS databases is 1996–2010, however we exclude the last year because
of poor coverage.
• We drop firms with faulty records and firms with inconsistent informa-
tion on any generic variables such as date of establishment/type of com-
pany/template etc.
• We drop firm-year observations with negative values of all types of as-
sets/capital/reserves and deposits.
The following sample selection criteria are applied to obtain the final samples
used in the regression analysis:
• We drop firms if any of total assets, current liabilities, and non-current
liabilities is missing in all years between 1996–2009.
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• We drop firms if any of total assets, employment, sales, operating revenue,
current liabilities, and non-current liabilities is negative.
• We drop firms whose total number of employees is lower than 10.
• We drop firms if total assets are less than 100,000 in PPP dollars.
• We drop firms if sales are less than 1000 in PPP dollars.
• We drop firms if operating revenue are less than 1000 in PPP dollars.
• We drop firm-year observations beyond the 0.1% and 99.9% tails of ratios
employment/sales,sales/total assets, operating revenue/total assets, and
shareholders funds/total assets
• In the data that covers European firms, we drop countries having less than
100 firms for at least 6 years between 1996–2009.
• We drop firm-year observations beyond the 0.1% and 99.9% tails of all
leverage measures.
• We drop firm-year observations beyond the 0.1% and 99.9% tails for col-
lateral variable defined as total fixed assets/total assets.
• We drop firm-year observations beyond the 0.1% and 99.9% tails for all
profitability measures.
The resulting samples consist of 54,108 firms with 152,124 observations and
234,380 firms with 1,495,671 observations for the US firm-level sample and the
European firm-level sample, respectively.
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B.1.3 Bank-Level Variables
Total Assets : Total book value of intangible, tangible, and other fixed assets.
Shareholder’s Funds : Book value of equity (issued share capital plus other
shareholders fund)
Off-Balance Sheet Items : In financial statement of banks, off-balance sheet
volumes are listed in three summary lines of acceptances, documentary credits,
and guarantees.
Guarantees : Total amount guaranteed by the bank.
Acceptances (reported off-balance sheet): Total amounts the bank “accepts”
to pay, usually under international trade finance arrangements where reported
off-balance sheet.
Committed credit lines : Total committed and undrawn lines of credit ex-
tended by the bank. Adjusted Assets : Book value of total assets excluding
goodwill and intangibles.
B.1.4 Firm-Level Variables
Total Assets : Total book value of intangible, tangible, and other fixed assets.
Shareholder’s Funds : Book value of equity (issued share capital plus other
shareholder funds).
Total Liabilities : Total book value of current (all current liabilities of the
company such as Loans+ Creditors+ Other current liabilities) and non-current
liabilities (all long term liabilities of the company such as Long term financial
debt+other long term liabilities and provisions).
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B.1.5 Country-Level Data
We use the Barth, Caprio, and Levine data set on Bank Regulation. It provides
information on bank regulation and supervisory practice for 107 countries and
provides aggregate indexes based on responses to a survey.1 We use the 2003
values of the following variables: 1) “Supervision Index,” which measures the
efficiency of supervision and takes a value of 1 if there are multiple independent
supervisors for banks and zero otherwise and 2) “Monitoring Index,” which
measures the efficiency of monitoring and takes a value of 1 if the top ten banks
in the country are all rated by international rating agencies, if off-balance sheet
items are disclosed to public, if banks must disclose risk management procedures
to the public, and if subordinated debt is required as part of regulatory capital
and zero otherwise.
1For the details on the survey questions and data collection process, see Barth, Caprio,
and Levine (2007)
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Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics: International Comparison of
Leverage Ratios of Banks in US & Europe
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006-2009
Aggregated Mean Median Aggregated Mean Median Aggregated Mean Median Aggregated Mean Median N
US 12.7 10.2 10.2 12.9 10 10 11.6 10.2 10.2 9.9 10.7 10.2 7372
Austria 20.5 71.1 16.2 19 60.3 16.3 20.1 63.2 15.4 19.4 50.9 16.9 49
Belgium 15.1 14.3 15.3 12.1 12.2 14 12.6 12.5 12.9 13.2 12.7 12.5 3
Bulgaria 7.9 7.9 7.7 8.4 9.8 8.8 7.4 9.6 9.4 6.1 8.4 7.8 6
Croatia 7.2 9.2 9.9 7.2 9 10.2 6.4 7.6 8.1 6.1 7.1 7.6 6
Cyprus 19.8 19.8 19.8 16.1 16.1 16.1 15.2 15.2 15.2 15 15.3 15.3 2
Czech Republic 3.9 3.9 3.9 4 4 4 4.1 4.1 4.1 5.9 5.9 5.9 1
Denmark 16.6 9.8 7.9 17 10.2 8.3 17.9 11.2 8.6 17.8 11.5 9.8 67
Estonia 12.3 13.5 13.5 11.4 12.8 12.8 10.2 12.2 12.3 11.2 16.9 17.1 4
Finland 20.4 56.5 23.4 22.7 81.2 22.6 30.3 327.1 28.2 25.1 58.3 26.1 4
France 20.7 21.7 12.8 23.8 22.3 12.3 24.4 23.5 12.3 21.3 34.2 11.6 173
Germany 30.7 19.7 17.5 31.7 19.5 17.4 35.8 20.4 17.9 28.5 19.2 17.1 471
Hungary 16.7 16.8 13.9 16.8 17.6 15.1 19.3 18.5 17.3 18.9 16.8 15.7 4
Ireland 9.5 99.1 8.1 11.4 69.1 10.4 12.2 47 11.4 7.1 30.1 6.3 5
Latvia 12.6 11.6 11 10.8 11.8 10 10.3 11.9 12.1 9.6 11.5 11.4 9
Lithuania 16.2 16.2 16.2 14.5 14.5 14.5 13.9 13.9 13.9 14.2 14.2 14.2 1
Luxembourg 27 33.7 24.2 25.1 33.3 24.1 25.1 31.7 25.1 20.2 23.2 18.8 29
Netherlands 3.3 11 10.4 3.6 10.9 9 4 14 10.9 3.5 11.1 9.5 5
Romania 9.7 6.3 5.1 11.4 7.5 6.7 9.8 6.2 4.7 9.4 7.7 9.6 3
Russia 7 8.3 8.1 7.3 8 7.9 8.6 9.2 9 7.6 8.3 8.9 23
Sweden 18.1 23.3 18.7 19.2 24.6 13.8 19.7 18.1 16 19.9 24.4 17.9 11
Switzerland 7.7 14.4 10.5 8.2 13.7 10.4 8.8 13.5 10.8 9.2 13.9 11 179
Ukraine 9.3 8.5 8.4 11.4 11.3 11.3 11.9 11.7 12.1 7.6 11.4 7.7 5
United Kingdom 30.4 17.4 15.6 32.3 18 15.5 32.1 16.7 14.5 16.8 12.5 13.4 67
Notes: Table B.1 reports aggregate, mean, and median leverage ratios and number of banks
in U.S., Europe. Leverage is calculated as total assets over equity where total assets is defined
as total book value of intangible, tangible, and other fixed assets. Aggregate leverage is cal-
culated as aggregated assets over aggregated equity, with bank-level observations aggregated
by the authors. The number of banks reported are lower than the number of banks used in
the regression analysis because they refer to the permanent bank sample, defined as banks
with non-missing asset data throughout the sample period.
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Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics: International Comparison of
Leverage Ratios of Banks in the Rest of the World
2006 2007 2008 2006-2008
Aggregated Mean Median Aggregated Mean Median Aggregated Mean Median N
Argentina 7.5 6.9 6.7 7.7 7.2 6.5 8.3 7.4 7.2 58
Azerbaijan 12.5 10.4 11.6 11 10.1 10.6 9.7 8.7 9.2 3
Bangladesh 33.8 12.3 16.5 18.8 17.6 15 17 16.1 15.5 11
Brazil 11.6 10 8.8 11.3 10.1 7.7 12.7 10.2 9.1 46
Canada 20.5 20.5 13.1 21.6 18.9 14.1 21.8 28.2 13.4 39
China 44.7 30.8 27.9 -21.8 19 18.3 23.7 20.5 20.8 13
Colombia 7.8 8.5 9.1 8 8.7 9.9 8.3 8.6 9.1 17
Costa Rica 9 9.8 10.9 9.4 9.6 10 9 9.1 9.2 25
El Salvador 8.3 7.9 8.3 8.2 8.4 8.7 7.6 8 8.1 13
Georgia 3.2 3.2 3.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 4.5 4.5 4.5 1
India 14.8 14.8 15.6 15.6 15.2 15.6 13.6 14.8 15.2 63
Indonesia 9.4 8.8 9.7 9.6 8.6 9.3 10.6 9.7 10.2 16
Israel 16.3 17 17.1 15.6 16.3 15.9 16.8 17.6 16.5 7
Japan 18 35.2 18.8 16.8 19.8 18.2 18.5 25.9 19.9 710
Kenya 8.9 8.3 8.7 8.5 7.6 7.8 8 7.6 7.4 12
Korea 14 14.5 14.9 14.1 14.3 15.5 16.4 15.7 16.6 19
Malaysia 12.7 11 12.7 13 11.6 13 12.6 10.8 13.1 31
Mexico 7.7 8 8.5 7.5 8.5 8.5 10.8 13.3 13.4 15
Norway 6.6 10.7 9.4 7.9 11.4 9.9 8.8 11.8 10.7 10
Paraguay 7.9 8 7.9 9 9.3 9.2 8.9 9.3 8.9 12
Peru 10.2 10.1 10.3 11.5 10.9 11.9 12.6 12.4 11.8 13
Slovakia 12.2 18.3 16.2 13.3 17.3 15.8 13.5 19.6 14.1 3
Slovenia 11.8 12.1 12.5 12.2 11.4 11.2 12.5 11.8 11.8 4
Thailand 11.5 13.5 10.8 10.6 27.2 10.1 10.8 13.1 10.8 24
Turkey 9.3 10.7 8.9 8.2 9.3 7.8 8.6 8.7 8.7 11
Uruguay 2.4 2.4 2.4 3.1 3.1 3.1 5.3 5.3 5.3 1
Venezuela 11.8 11.5 11.5 11.3 11.8 11.9 11.1 11.5 11.2 8
Notes: Table B.2 reports aggregate, mean, and median leverage ratios and number of banks
in the countries in the rest of the word. Leverage is calculated as total assets over equity
where total assets is defined as total book value of intangible, tangible, and other fixed assets.
Aggregate leverage is calculated as aggregated assets over aggregated equity, with bank-level
observations aggregated by the authors. The number of banks reported are lower than the
number of banks used in the regression analysis because they refer to the permanent bank
sample, defined as banks with non-missing asset data throughout the sample period.
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Figure B.1: Non-Financial Sector Leverage Ratio






















































































Notes: Panels A and B display mean leverage for non-financial firms in US and Europe,
respectively. The leverage ratio is defined as total assets over equity. Non-financial firms refer
to all firms, excluding financial firms with Primary NACE Rev. 1.1 sector code J (Financial
intermediation). Listed non-financial firms are those listed on a stock exchange. Foreign non-
financial firms are non-financial firms which are foreign owned, defined as more than 10% of
their voting shares owned by a foreign company.
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Figure B.2: Cash Holdings of US Banks
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Notes: Panel A displays cash holdings as a ratio of assets for all banks in the US, as well
as for large banks, aggregated from bank-level data. Panel B displays the median of the cash
holdings ratio for all banks and large banks. A “large bank” has more than one billion dollars
worth of assets in 2000.
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Figure B.3: (Cont’d.) Cash Holdings of European Banks
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Notes: Panel A displays cash holdings as a ratio of total assets for all banks in Europe, as
well as for large banks, aggregated from bank-level data. Panel B displays the median of cash
holdings of all banks as well as of large banks. A “large bank” has more than one billion
dollars worth of assets in 2000.
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Notes: The figure shows the US VIX index and aggregate US leverage. The VIX index is
the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index which measures the implied
volatility of S&P 500 index options. A high value corresponds to a more volatile market.
Daily VIX data is obtained from the website of the Chicago Board Options Exchange www.
cboe.com/micro/vix. The leverage figure repeats Panel B of Figure 3.4.
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